Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 3 Issue 1 by Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Notre Dame Law Reporter Law School Publications
11-1921
Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 3 Issue 1
Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlaw_reporter
Part of the Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Reporter by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Notre Dame Law Reporter Association, "Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 3 Issue 1" (1921). Notre Dame Law Reporter. Book 8.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlaw_reporter/8
VOLUME III
NOTRE DAME
LAW REPORTER
NOVEMBER, 1921
CONTENTS
Page
STUDENTS' DEPARTMENT
SUPREME COURT OF NOTRE DAME,
TAYLOR VS. BLANCHETT- --------
DAVENPORT VS. REILLY . ....-.-------
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, TAYLOR------
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BLANCHETT - -
NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT, .....
JUNIOR MOOT COURT ...-. ....-.-------
ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
EDITORIALS . . . . .
CLASS-ICKS
LAW SCHOOL NEWS- - ------
Opinion of the Court - 2
Opinion of the Court 7
Henry W. Fritz - - 11
William S. Allen - - - 15
Record of Cases - - - 19
Record -.--- --. 23
The Staff - - - - .28
Unknown - - - - .33
Aaron H. Huguenard 33
ALUMNI DEPARTMENT
CONTRIBUTING SECTION
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW - - Leo J. Hassenauer - 36
NEWS SECTION
ABOUT THE ALUMNI - ------ -Vincent B. Pater 37
CLASS OF '21 AT THE BAR-- - - - Their Letters 40
THE ALUMNI DIRECTORY . . . . .. . . . - 43
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I_
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME ss
Be it remembered: That the Notre Dame Law Reporter
will be published at Notre Dame, Indiana, quarterly during
the scholastic year, for $2.00 per year or 50c per copy; that
the Reporter has been entered as second-class matter at
the Postoffice at Notre Dame, Indiana, and that copyright
has been granted.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER ASSOCIATION
Notre Dame, Indiana.
NUMBER I
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SUPREME COURT OF NOTRE DAME
TAYLOR VS. BLANCHETT
No. 11
Broker's Contract-Commission-Procur-
ing Cause of Sale-Purchaser, Ready, Able
and Willing-Reserved Right to Revoke-
Good Faith-Revocation-Sale Completed
,by Principal-Construction of Contract.
1. Where, by the terms of a real estate
broker's contract, the principal agrees to
pay the broker a stipulated commission if
he sells certain real estate, or if he pro-
cures a purchaser, or if he assists in any
way to effect a sale, and such contract ex-
pressly reserves to the principal the right
at any time to withdraw- such land from
sale or exchange, if the broker procures a
customer, introduces him to the principal,
inspects the land and is negotiating for a
sale, and then the principal revokes the
agency and concludes the sale with such
customer without the aid of the broker, the
principal is liable for the stipulaed com-
mission.
2. In this case the facts and circum-
stances sustain the inference that the prin-
cipal did not act in good faith in revoking
the agency, but did so to avoid payment of
commission.
3. In procuring a customer and nego-
tiating for a sale, the broker is the procur-
ing cause, although the principal revokes
the agency and alone concludes the sale
with such customer.
4. The fact that the purchaser procured
by the broker was ready, able and willing
to buy, is conclusively established by the
fact that the principal concluded the sale
with such purchaser.
5. Where the contract specifies no time
limit for the broker's performance a rea-
sonable time is implied. And where the
principal revokes the agency and effects a
sale with the purchaser procured by the
broker and with whom the broker has begun
negotiations, the principal cannot claim
that the contract was not performed within
a reasonable time.
6. Where the principal by the terms of
his contract agrees to pay the broker a
commission (1) if he sells the property, or(2) if he finds a purchaser, or (3) if he
assists in any way to effect a sale, the
broker is entitled to the commission if he
performs any one of the considerations
enumerated.
Special assumpsit action in the
Notre Dame Circuit Court by Ear-
nest M. Blanchett against Albert B.
Taylor. From a judgment for the
plaintiff the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Henry W. Fritz, Edmund J.
Meagher and George M. Witteried
for appellant.
William S. Allen, Frank Frances-
covich and Frank Coughlin, for
appellee.
VULPILLAT, J. The appellee,
Earnest M. Blanchett, brought action
in special assumpsit on a real estate
broker's contract to recover two hun-
dred dollars commission alleged to
have been earned under that contract
on account of the sale of appellant's
farm. The second and third counts
of declaration upon which the case
was tried are founded upon the fol-
lowing written contract between the
parties:
"This agreement, made and en-
tered into this first day of September,
1920, witnesseth, that Albert B. Tay-
lor of St. Joseph County, Indiana,
has this day placed with Earnest M.
Blanchett of South Bend, Indiana, a
real estate agent, for sale or ex-
change the following described prop-
erty (description) containing in all
two hundred acres.
"The said Taylor agrees to pay to
said Blanchett Ond Dollar per acre
of said real estate commission out of
the first funds received in payment
on account of such sale or on the ex-
change of said property in case a
purchaser is found, or said property
is sold or exchanged through said
Blanchett or through his influence,
or if he assists in any way in the sale
or exchange of said property.
"The said Albert B. Taylor re-
serves the right to withdraw said
property from sale or .exchange at
any time by giving ten days notice in
writing, and this agreement to re-
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main in full force until such notice is
given and expires.
"It is further agreed that if said
Albert B. Taylor shall secure a pur-
chaser without the aid or assistance
of said Earnest M. Blanchett, while
the property is still in his hands
under this contract, said Blanchett is
not to receive any compensation for
his services rendered. (Signed)
"Albert B. Taylor,
"Earnest M. Blanchett."
To the declaration, the appellant,
Taylor, filed plea in two counts: the
general issue traverse, and a confes-
sion and avoidance plea avering that
the defendant, in accordance with his
contract, terminated the agency in
good faith, serving the plaintiff with
written notice of revocation for ten
days, and thereafter, without the aid
of plaintiff, himself disposed of his
farm. Upon these issues the case
was submitted to the court for trial,
a jury being waived. The court found
for the plaintiff and rendered judg-
ment accordingly. A motion for a
new trial was overruled and this ap-
peal perfected.
The errors assigned for reversal of
the judgment are the overruling of
the motion for a new trial; that the
judgment is contrary to the evidence,
is not supported by sufficient evi-
dence, and is contrary to law. The
court is not disposed to consider the
assigned errors based on the evi-
dence. The trial court considered
the evidence in arriving at the find-
ing, and again considered the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to sustain
that finding when ruling on the mo-
tion for a new trial. It is not the
province of the appellate court to con-
sider the evidence de novo with a
view to substituting its finding for
that of the trial court. And it is only
upon a clear showing that the evi-
dence is contrary to the finding or
that it is insufficient to support it
that an appellate court would be war-
ranted in disturbing the trial court's
finding or the jury's verdict. Duff-
Pioneer Stock Powder Co. vs. Koontz,
Notre Dame Law Reporter, Nov.,
1920, pg. 2. Furthermore, the appel-
lant does not sufficiently set forth
and discuss in his brief the record
evidence to present the errors as-
signed thereon, and these assign-
ments must therefore be regarded as
waived under the rule of court.
The theory upon which the appel-
lant seeks to prevail on this appeal
is that set out in his confession and
avoidance plea, namely: that because
appellee had not effected a sale of
the real estate before appellant in
good faith exercised his stipulated
right to terminate the agency, ap-
pellee is entitled to no commission.
This involves two propositions: (1)
that appellant acted in good faith in
revoking appellee's agency, and (2)
that appellee had not earned his com-
mission under his contract beyond
the power of the appellant by good
faith revocation to avoid liability
.therefor.
The general power of the principal
at any time to revoke his agent's
authority is, not quvstioned. The
principal has the right to revoke the
agency at any timne before the broker
finds a customer ready, able and wil-
ling to buy upon the principal's
terms. Young vs. Trainor, 158 Ill.
428-42 N. E. 139; Provident Trust
Co. vs. Darrough, 168 Ind. 29-78 N.
E. 1030; Benton vs. Brown, 145 Iowa
604-124 N. W. 815; West vs. Demme,
128 Mich. 11-87 N. W. 95; Donovan
vs. Weed, 182 N. Y. 43-74 N. E. 563
And a broker is not ordinarily enti-
tled to a commission for a sale made
by the principal after the principal
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has in good faith revoked the agency,
even if the sale be to the very person
with whom the broker has been ne-
gotiating. Sibbald vs. Bethlehem
Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378-38 Am. Rep.
441; Alden vs. Erl, 121 N. Y. 688-24
N. E. 705; Neal vs. Lehman, 11 Tex.
C. A. 461-34 S. W. 153; Earnest vs.
Cahill, 166 Cal. 493-137 Pac. 256;
Blogett vs Sioux City R. Co., 63 Iowa
606-19 N. W. 799; Stedman vs. Rich-
ardson, 100 Ky. 79-37 S. W. 259;
Staehlin vs. Kramer, 118 Mo. App.
329-94 S. W. 785. But the principal,
in revoking such agency, must act in
good faith and not merely for the
purpose of avoiding liability to the
broker for commission. Uphoff vs.
Ulrich, 2 Ill. App. 399; O'Connell vs.
Casey, 206 Mass. 520-92 N. E. 804;
Friedenwald vs. Welch, 174 Mich.
399-140. N. W. 564; Bowe vs. Cage,
132 Wis. 441-112 N. W. 469-12 L.
R. A. (NS) 265; White vs. Hollman,
(Texas C. A.) 180 S. W. 286; Branch
vs. Moore, 84 Ark. 462-105 S. W.
1178-120 Am. St. Rep. 78.
The proposition that appellant act-
ed in good faith in revoking
appellee's agency, and not merely to
avoid payment of commission, pre-
sents an issue of fact which was de-
termined adversely to appellant by
the trial court. But appellant ear-
nestly maintains that there is no
evidence of bad faith in the record,
and that his own testimony establish-
es his good faith. In such cases as
this the fact of good or bad faith of
the principal in revoking the agency
must be determined almost wholly by
inference from the facts and circum-
stances proven in the case., The facts
of appellant's case tend strongly to
sustain the inference that appellant's
revocation of appellee's agency was
not made in good faith but was made
to avoid payment of commission to
appellee under the contract. Courts
have sustained such inference upon
fewer facts than appear in appellant's
case. In Cadigan vs. Crabtree, 179
Mass 474-61 N. E. 37-88 Am. St.
Rep. 397-55 L. R. A. 77, the court
said: "It perhaps might be assumed
that a broker's authority is revoked
in bad faith where negotiations had
been carried on by the broker for his
principal and had progressed so far
that he was found to be the efficient
cause in fact (as in appellant's case)
of a trade subsequently struck be-
tween the principal and customr." To
the same effect is the decision of the
court in the case of Dodge vs. Chil-
ders, 167 Mo. App. 448-151 S. W. 749.
Appellant testified that the pur-
chaser, procured by the appellee and
with whom the appellee had negotiat-
ed the terms of sale upon which ap-
pellant, after revoking the agency,
closed the deal, had refused to con-
clude such sale through the appellee
as agent. This could furnish no legal
excuse for revocation of the agency
and avoidance of liability for com-
mission under the contract. In a
similar cas'e the Texas Civil Court of
Appeals declared that bad faith or
intent of the principal to defeat the
broker's right to ' commission may
be inferred from the fact that the
parties took the matter up directly
with each other, when both lWew
the efforts of the broker to effect a
sale, and from the further fact that
the purchaser had previously made
an effort to eliminate the broker.
Anderson vs. Crow, 151 S. W. 1080.
We cannot disturb the finding of the
trial court on the issue of appellant's
alleged good faith revocation of ap-
pellee's agency.
Even if it were conceded that ap-
pellant acted in good faith in revok-
ing the agency, we are of opinion
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that appellee's commission had been
earned under his contract so as to be
wholly unaffected by such revocation.
To have avoided liability for commis-
sion appellant must not only have
acted in good faith in the revocation
of appellee's agency but he must
have notified appellee of such revoca-
tion before he had performed his
contract. Bash vs. Hill, 62 Ill.
216; Stiewell vs. Lally, 89 Ark. 195-
115 S. W. 1134; Clements vs. Staple-
ton, 136 Iowa 137-113 N. W. 546.
Where the principal terminates the
agency after the broker has found a
person ready, able and willing to buy
on terms acceptable to the principal,
the broker is entitled to his commis-
sion, especially where the principal
subsequently sells the property to
such person. Weisels-Gerhart Real
Estate Co., vs. Epstein, 157 Mo. App.
101-137 S. W. 326; New Kanawaha
Coal Co., vs. Wright, 163 Ind. 529-72
N. E. 550; Reishus-Reme Land Co.
vs. Berner, 91 Minn. 401-98 N. W.
186; Day vs. Porter, 161 Ill. 235-43
N. E. 1073; Birdsell vs. Fraenzel, 154
Wis. 48-142 N. W. 274; Smith vs.
Plant, 216 Mass. 91-103 N. E. 58;
McGovern vs. Bennett, 146 Mich. 558-
109 N. W. 1055; Maddox vs. Hard-
ing, 91 Nebr. 292-135 N. W. 1019.
In general there are three different
methods for earning a commission as
a real estate broker: (1) by effecting
a binding contract of sale for the
principal under authority to the
broker to make a sale; (2) by pro-
ducing a purchaser to whom a sale
is in fact made; (3) by producing a
purchaser ready, able and willing to
buy on terms specified in the brok-
er's contract or acceptable to the
principal. McDermott vs. Mahony,
129 Iowa, 292-115 N. W. 32-116N. W.
788: Godfrey vs. Weisner, 169 Cal.
667-147 Pac. 952. In appellant's
case the appellee procured the pur-
chaser to whom appellant sold his
farm. Appellee was the procuring
cause of the sale, notwithstanding
the appellant concluded the transac-
tion himself without the further aid
of appellee. A broker may be the
procuring cause of the sale whether
he concludes the transaction in the
principal's behalf or the principal
does so himself. Doran vs. Bussard,
18 N. N. App. 36-45 N. Y. Sup. 387;
Loud vs. Hall, 106 Mass. 404; Lewis
vs. NcDonald, 83 Nebr. 694-120 N.
W. 207; Jennings vs. Trummer, 52
Oreg. 149-96 Pac. 874-132 Am. St.
Rep. 680-23 L. R. A. (NS) 164.
"Where the parties are brought to-
gether as a result of the broker's ef-
forts, and a sale, lease or exchange
results, the broker becomes entitled
to a commission, although he is not
present during the negotiations fol-
lowing the introduction or takes no
part therein." 9 Corpus Juris 615,
Sec. 97, note 25; Tucker vs. Hawley,
23 Cal. A. 460-138 Pac. 358; Tonkin-
Clark Realty Co. vs. Hedges, 24 Ida-
ho 304-133 Pac. 669, Henry vs. Stew-
art, 185 Ill. 448-57 N. E. 190; Haf-
ner vs. Herron, 165 Ill. 242-46 N. E.
211; Gouge vs. Hoyt, 127 Iowa 340-
101 N. W. 463; Douville vs. Com-
stock, 110 Mich. 693-69 N. W. 79;
Willard vs. Wright, 203 Mass. 406-89
N. E. 559; Burdon vs. Briquelet, 125
Wis. 341-104 N. W. 83; Wolverton vs.
Tuttle, 51 Oreg. 501-94 Pac. 961.
That the purchaser procured by
the appellee was ready, able and wil-
ling to buy is conclusively establish-
ed by the fact that he actually bought
upon terms negotiated by appellee
and accepted by appellant. Coffman
vs. Dyas Realty Co. 176 Mo. App.
692-159 S. W. 842; Handley vs. Shaf-
er, 177 Ala. 636-59 So. 286; Ketcham
vs. Alexander, 160 Iowa 455-142 N.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
W. 62: Hutchinson vs Plant, 218
Mass. 148-105 N.E. 1017; Schlegel vs.
Fuller, (Okla.) 149 Pac. 1118. Where
such sale is concluded by the princi-
pal or upon report by the brokertothe
principal is confirmed, it is not neces-
sary to prove that the purchaser was
ready, able and willing to buy. Kolp
vs. Brazer, (Tex. Civ. A.) 161 S. W.
899; Stoutenburg vs Evans, 142
Iowa 239-120 N. W. 59.
If it be a fact that the purchaser
was unwilling to conclude the sale
through the appellee, this is no evi-
dence of unwillingndss to purchase
appellant's land. That the purchas-
er procured by appellee was willing
to purchase the land is clearly estab-
lished by the evidence that he accom-
panied appellee to the appellant's
farm and with him made an inspec-
tion thereof with a view to purchas-
ing; that he was introduced to ap-
pellant by appellee; that he entered
into negotiations with the appellee
and virtually agreed to the terms of
purchase upon which appellant him-
self subsequently effected the sale.
Unwillingness of the purchaser in
this case, if any, went to the matter
of concluding the sale through the ap-
pellee and not at all to the matter of
purchasing appellant's farm. But
this is not the element of willingness
that, in contemplation of law, makes
a principal liable to a broker who
procures a purchaser, ready, able
and willing to buy. Neither the prin-
cipal nor the customer can break off
negotiations and defeat the broker's
right to a commission by concluding
the transaction without his aid, aft-
er the broker has found a customer
and begun negotiations under his
contract, 9 Corpus Juris 619, See. 99;
Church vs. Dunham, 14 Idaho 776-
96 Pac. 203; Rigdon vs. Move, 226
Ill. 382-80 N. E. 901; Gibson vs.
Hunt, (Iowa) 94 N. W. 277; Treacy
vs. Gilman, 161 Ky. 513-171 S. W.
153; Malcoon vs Barrett, 192 Mass.
552-78 N. E. 560; Hubbard vs. Lei-
ter, 145 Mich. 387-108 N. W. 735.
The case of Fultz vs. Weimer, 34
Kan. 576-9 Pac. 316, cited and stress-
ed by appellant, gives no support
whatever to appellant's case. The
following decisions of the Supreme
Court of Kansas sustain the right of
the appellee to recover commission
from appellant under their contract:
Morros vs. Francis, 75 Kan. '58-16
Am. St. Rep. 512; Stephens vs. Scott,
43 Kan. 285-23 Pac. 555; Putnam vs.
King, 96 Kan. 109-150 Pac. 559;
Beaugher vs. Clark, 81 Kan. 250-106
Pac. 39-27 L. R. A. (NS) 198. The
Fultz vs. Weimer decision merely
supports the proposition that where
the parties stipulate that an agency
to sell real estate is limited to a defin-
ite period, the contract terminates
at the expiration of that time, leaving
the principal free to negotiate a sale
to anyone, even to the person with
whom the broker negotiated. This is
for the reason that the broker con-
tracted to sell the land, and to do so
in sixty days. He did neither and his
contract terminated by its own
terms. In appellant's case appellee
did not contract to sell the land for
his commission, nor does the contract
specify any limit of time within
which performance must be made. In
such case a reasonable time is im-
plied. Geiger vs. Keiser, 47 Colo.
297-107 Pac. 267; Harris vs. Moore,
134 Iowa, 704-112 N. W. 164. In the
case of Burd vs. Webster 128 Wis.
118-107 N. W. 23, a delay of four
months was held reasonable. Where
the broker finds a purchaser and is
negotiating with him for a sale, and
the principal himself completes the
transaction, such principal cannot
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claim that the sale was not negotiat-
ed within a reasonable time. Mor-
gan vs. Keller, 194 Mo. 663-92 S. W.
75; Moore vs. Boehm, 45 Misc. 622-
91 N. Y. Sup. 125.
In the Fultz vs. Weimer case the
principal contracted to pay a com-
mission upon the sole consideration
that the broker sell the real estate;
the appellant, however, by the ex-
press terms of his contract agrees to
pay appellee the stipulated commis-
sion upon any one of three consider-
ations, (1) the sale or exchange of
thd property, (2) for finding a pur-
chaser, and (3) for assisting in any
way to effect a sale or exchange. Both
the second and third considerations
were furnished before appellant at-
tempted to revoke the agency, and, as
we have seen, appellee is entitled to
credit for the sale negotiated by him
but completed by appellant himself.
If appellee did any one of the things
he contracted to do he is entitled to
his commission. Walker Mfg. Co.,
vs. Knox, 136 Fed. 334; Sill vs.
Caschi, 167 Cal. 698-140 Pac. 949;
Bartow vs. Parsons Pulp Co. 208
Mass. 232-94 N. E. 312. And the re-
vocation of his agency did not affect
his right to recover for the services
rendered in the transaction ultimate-
ly completed by appellant. Smith vs.
Anderson, 2 Idaho 537-21 Pac. 4121;
Martin vs. Holly, 104 N. C. 36-10 S.
E. 83; New Kanawha Coal Co. vs
Wright, 163 Ind. 529-72 N. E. 550;
Mechem on Agency, 63.
The contract in appellant's case as
firmly establishes his liability to pay
the appellee the commission which
he earned, as did the contract in the
Fultz vs. Weimer case exhonorate the
principal from liability for commis-
sion which the broker did not earn.
The principle of that case is that
where the contract by its express
terms determines the rights and lia-
bilities of the contracting parties,
such contract is conclusive upon both
principal and broker; and that prin-
ciple must be applied against appel-
lant in this case. Appellant's con-
tract is impossible of such a construc-
tion as would enable him to defeat
appellee's right to a commission upon
the mere arbitrary exercise of ap-
pellant's reserved right to revoke the
agency at any time.
The trial court's finding is fully
sustained by the evidence and is in
complete accord with" the law; and
this sustaines the ruling of the court
on the motion for a new trial. Find-
ing no error in the record, the lower
court's judgment is in all things af-
firmed.
DAVENPORT* vs. REILLY
No. 12
Tort-Negligence--Civil Action for Dam-
ages-Violation of City Ordinanceas Con-
tributory Negligence-Efficient Cause or
Condition-Proximate Cause - Instruction
Construed and Sustained.
1. Although R. parks his limousine at
the street curb in violation of the city ordi-
nance, he is entitled to recover the damages
caused by the negligence of D. in driving
his car into the limousine, unless the park-
ing of the limousine actually contributes as
a proximate cause to effect the damage.
2. If the conduct or omission constitut-
ing a violation of a statute or ordinance is
part of the res gestae or transaction com-
plained of, such conduct or omission is neg-
ligence per se, as a matter of law, and the
court should so instruct the jury.
3. Negligent acts amounting to a viola-
tion of a city ordinance held to be a mere
condition and not an efficient or proximate
cause for the damage, and therefore not
constituting contributory negligence in bar
of plaintiff's right of action.
Civil action for damages to plain-
tiff's limousine on account of the al-
leged willful and negligent conduct of
defendant. From a judgment for
plaintiff defendant appeals. Af-
flirrized.
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John J. Buckley and Franklyn E.
Miller or appellant.
Bernard Vincent Pater and Aaron
H. ttuguenard for appellee.
VUR.PILLAT, J. This is a civil
action in which the plaintiff recover-
ed a judgment against the defendant
for $650 damages alleged to have
sustained through the negligent and
willful conduct of the plaintiff ai
driving his automobile into the lim-
ousine of the plaintiff while said lim-
ousine was parked at the curbing in
Michigan Street in the city of South
Bend, Indiana. Plaintiff's complaint
is in two paragraphs; the first based
on the theory that the damage was
caused by the defendant in careless-
ly and negligently operating and
driving his automobile at and against
the limousine of the plaintiff while
such limousine was parked in the
street named, and without the fault
or negligence of plaintiff; the
second paragraph alleges that the
fendant wantonly and willfully drove
his car into the limousine of plaintiff.
The defendant answered in general
denial to each of these paragraphs of
complaint, and upon the issues so
formed the case was submitted to a
jury for trial. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff in the sum
of $650. Motion for new trial on the
alleged ground of erroneous instruc-
tions and that the verdict is contrary
to the law and the evidence was over-
ruled. Judgment was then entered
on the verdict and this appeal taken.
Appellant assigns as error the ov-
erruling of the motion for a new
trial, and that the verdict and judg-
ment are contrary to the law and the
evidence. As a reason why a new
trial should be granted it is contend-
ed that the court's instruction num-
ber nine, given to the jury of the
court's own motion, is erroneous.
The instructions are properly in the
record and the particular instruction
complained of is as follows:
"It has been admitted that at the
time of the collision complained of
the plaintiff's limousine was parked
in violation of a city ordinance of the
City of South Bend. The defendant
contends that this constitutes con-
tributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff which precludes recov-
ery. Upon this issue the court in-
structs you that, if you find it to be a
fact that the plaintiff's limousine
was actually parked in violation of
the city ordinance, this would in law
constitute negligence per se., but the
court instructs you that that fact
alone does not constitute contributory
negligence and bar plaintiff's right to
recover for the damages caused prox-
imately by the negligence of the de-
fendant, if such is found, but, not-
withstanding such unlawful parking
of the car, it still would remain for
the jury to determine from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence whether
such negligent parking of the car
also proximately contributed to cause
the damages alleged. And in deter-
mining whcther such negligent park-
ing of plaintiff's car was a contribut-
ing proximate cause with that of de-
fendant's alleged negligence, you
should apply the rule already stated
as to what is proximate cause for in-
jury or damage. Was the alleged ille-
gal parking of plaintiff's car, in it-
self, an efficient cause for the colli-
sion, actually causing or contribut-
ing to cause proximately the damage
complained of; or was it a mere con-
dition not capable of being an efficient
cause, or not necessarily nor proxi-
mately contributing as a cause to
produce the damage alleged to be
due solely to the negligence of the de-
fendant. If the illegal parking of the
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car was a mere condition, or if it was
not a proximate cause, then your ver-
dict should be for the plaintiff, not-
withstanding such illegal parking of
the car, providing you find that the
damage was due to the defendant's
negligence as alleged. If you should
find that the car as illegally parked
did in fact contribute as a proximate
cause to produce the damage com-
plained of, then your verdict should
be for the defendant."
It is well settled as an abstract
proposition of law that the violation
of a city ordinance, no less than of a
statute, may constitute negligence
per se, or as a matter of law. Butz vs.
Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503-38 S. W.
1104-59 Am. St. Rep. 504; Smith vs.
Milwaukee Bldrs' Exch., 91 Wis. 360-
64 N. W. 1041-51 Am. St. Rep. 912-
30 L. R. A. 504; Louisville etc. R. Co.,
vs. Davis, 7 Ind. App. 222-33 N. E.
451; Wabash R. Co. vs. Kamradt, 109
Ill. App. 203. And the violation of a
city ordinance by the injured party
may constitute contributory negli-
gence in bar of recovery. Boshart
vs. Little, 59 Conn. 1-21 Atl. 925-11
L. R. A. 33; Weller vs. Chicago etc.
R. Co., 120 Mo. 635-23 S. W. 1061-26
S. W. 532. It must appear, however,
that the acts or omissions which con-
stitute a violation of the ordinance
are part of the res gestae or transac-
tion of the case, that is, enter into
the negligence or contributory negli-
gence alleged to have caused the dam-
age. Ubelman vs. American Ice Co.,
209 Pa. St. 398-58 Atl. 849. In this
case the parking of plaintiff's limou-
sine is alleged not only to have been
in violation of the city ordinance but
also to have constituted such negli-
gence as contributed proximately to
cause the damage sustained. It was
therefore the duty of the court to in-
struct the jury, as was done, that
plaintiff's parking of his limousine, if
found to be inviolation of the city
ordinance, was negligence per se.
Lloyd vs. Pugh, 158 Wis. 441, 149 N.
W. 150; Smith vs. M. B. & T. E., 91
Wis., 360, 64 N. W. 1041, 30 L. R. A.
504, 51 A. M. St. Rep. 912.
But, as stated by the court in the
instruction, the fact of parking the
car at the street curb in such manner
as to be in violation of the city ordin-
ance, and per se negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, was not suffi-
cient of itself to consitute contribu-
tory negligence in bar of plaintiff's
right of recovery, for, notwithstand-
ing such negligent and unlawful
parking of the car, it still would re-
main for the jury to determine from
a preponderance of the evidence that
such negligent parking of the car
proximately contributed to cause the
damage. Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104
Mass. 59, 6 Am. Rep. 191, where a
wagon parked in violation of an or-
dinance held not proximate cause;
Railroad Co. vs. Buck, 116 Ind. 566,
19 N. E. 453; Tacket vs. Taylor, 123
Iowa 149, 98 N. W. 730; Southwick
vs. Hall, etc. Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21
At!. 924, 21 Am. St. Rep. 104, 12 L.
R. A. 279; Flynn vs. San Francisco
R. Co., 40 Cal. 14, 6 Am. Rep. 695.
The court further instructed the
jury that, in determining whether
the negligent parking of plaintiff's
'car was a conributing proximate
cause with that of defendant's alleged
negligence, they should apply the
rule already stated as to what was
proximate cause as applied to defend-
ant's negligence. This rule was cor-
rectly stated in the instruction refer-
red to. Indeed, no complaint is made
of such insruction. In applying the
same test to both parties for determ-
ining whether the negligence of each
was a proximate or remote cause of
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the damage, the trial court commit-
ted no error. As said in one case
"plaintiff's (contributory) negli-
gence must be the proximate cause
in the same sense in which the de-
fendant's negligence must have been
a proximate cause in order to give
him a right of action." Rider vs.
Syracuse Rapid Tr. Co., 171 N. Y.
139, 63 N. E. 836, 58 L. R. A. 125;
Boyce vs. Wilbur Lmbr. Co., 119
Wis 642, 97 N. W. 563.
The instruction was also correct in
directing the jury to return a ver-
dict for the plaintiff, if they found
the alleged illegal parking of plain-
tiff's limousine was in itself a mere
condition and not capable of being an
efficient cause, or not contributing
proximately to causu the damage,
providing they found such damage
to be due solely to the defendant's al-
leged negligence; but that the ver-
dict should be for the defendant if
the jury should find that the plain-
tiff's limousine as illegally parked
did contribute as a proximate cause
to the alleged damage. No injured
party may recover damages where
his own illegal or wrongful act is ne-
cessarily involved in the proof of his
own case; such, for instance, as a
plaintiff's own trespass or contribu-
tory negligence. Oates vs. Metropoli-
tan St. R. Co., 168 Mo. 535, 68 S. W.
906, 58 L. R. A. 447; *Bittner vs.
Tract. Co., 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. (NS.)
604; Evansville etc. R. Co. vs. Dun-
can, 28 Ind. 441, 92 Am. Dec. 322;
Rasper vs. Kopp, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2342
73 S. W. 1127; Lehigh Valley R. Co.
vs. Greiner, 113 Pa. St. 600, 6 Atl.
246. On the other hand, if plaintiff's
wrongful or illegal act does not enter
into the proof of his case he may re-
cover. Schultz vs. Paul, N. D. Law
Rep., Apr. 1920, pg. 10; Cranford
vs. Dressler, N. D. Law Rep. Apr.
1921. pg. 2.
Whether or not the illegal parking
of plaintiff's limousine contributed
proximately to cause the damage of
which plaintiff complained, was a
question of fact for the jury to de-
termine. See Milwaukee & St. P.
Ry. Co. vs. Kellog, 94 U. S. 469, 24
Law Ed. 256; Schumacher vs. St. P.
etc. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39. 48 N. W.
559, 12 L. R. A. 257. And we cannot
disturb the verdict og the jury on
this issue of fcat. The trial court
refused to do so upon consideration
of the moion for a new trial, and the
trial court is much better qualified to
pass upon issues of fact determined
onthetrial thanis the appellate court.
The insruction complained of is
not erroneous in any particular. The
verdict is amply supported by the evi-
dence in the record, and the motion
for a new trial was therefore prop-
erly overruled. We may say, how-
'ever that we have examined the re-
cord particularly with reference to
the evidence that might tend to sus-
tain the appellant's contention that
'plaintiff's negligent and illegal park-
ing of his limousine was a contribut-
ing proximate cause of the damage
sustained. There is little evidence
of the condition of the street at the
point where the collision occurred
as to its width, narrow or cramped
condition, heavy and continuous
street car service and general traffic,
particularly at the time of the colli-
sion, which would operate concur-
rently with the parked condition of
plaintiff's limousine so as to make
such negligence of the plaintiff a
proximate cause with the negligence
of the defendant to occasion the dam-
age sustained.
The verdict and judgment are not
contrary to law; there is no error in
the record. Judgment is affirmed.
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BRIEF OF HENRY W. FRITZ IN CASE OF
TAYLOR vs. BLANCHETT.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
Albert B. Taylor, Appellant
VS.
Earnest M. Blanchett, Appellee
NATURE OF ACTION.
This is an appeal brought by Al-
bert B. Taylor against the appellee,
Earnest M. Blanchett, from a judg-
ment rendered in favor of the ap-
pellee, in the Notre Dame Circuit
Court. The appellee as plaintiff, a
broker employed by defendant,
brought action in special assumpsit to
recover from Taylor a commission
which he claimed he was entitled to
for the sale of a certain tract of land
owned by Taylor and sold to one
Hardesty. The court entered judg-
ment in the sum of two hundred dol-
lars, ($200) principle and interest, in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
the defendant from which judgment
the defendant prosecutes his appeal
to this court.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The issues formed consisted of a
declaration in three counts. The de-
fendant filed a general demurrer to
the first count which was sustained,
and the plaintiff went to trial on the
last two counts of his declaration.
The defendant filed an amended
plea consisting of two counts: (1)
general issue (2) confession and
avoidance alleging that the defend-
ant in accordance with the terms of
the contract terminated the agency
in good faith, serving the plaintiff
with a written notice of the discon-
tinuance of the agency. The trial
was had, both parties waiving the
right to a trial by jury.
The defendants filed a motion for
a new trial on the following
grounds: (1) The finding is contrary
to the law; (2) The finding is con-
trary to the evidence.
Errors relied on for reversal: (1)
The judgment is contrary to law.
(2) The judgment is contrary to evi-
dence. (3) The judgment appealed
from is not supported by sufficient
evidence. (4) The court erred in
overruling the appellant's motion for
a new trial.
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF
THE EVIDENCE
The attorneys for Blanchett by the
evidence introduced relied wholly up-
on the fact that their client introduc-
ed the purchaser to Taylor and that
he was the procuring cause of the
sale which was made by Taylor. The
plaintiffs first exhibit consisted of
the following: (Contract of parties.
See Courts opinion ante.)
The second exhibit introduced in-
to evidence by the plaintiff consisted
of a notice of revocation sent to Blan-
chett by Taylor revoking his agency
dated Sept. 30, 1920. By additional
evidence the date of the sale of the
land by Taylor to Hardesty was es-
tablished, namely, October 15, 1920,
this being fifteen days after the date
that the notice of revocation was de-
livered to Blanchett.
A. B. Taylor's testimony showed
that he was desirous to have the
plaintiff effect a sale and that he re-
voked the agency only when he was
convinced that Blanchett would not
be able to close the deal. The plain-
tiffs made no effort and in fact did
not show, either by cross examina-
tion or by any direct evidence, that
Taylor acted in bad faith or revoked
the agency merely to defeat Blan-
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chett in the collection of his commis-
sion.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. The terms of a contract must
govern and courts can only enforce
'contracts as the parties themselves
made them. Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac.
316. Bacon vs. Cobb, 45 Ill. 47.
2. The broker cannot claim com-
missions upon a subsequent sale
made by his principal, even to the
identical individual introduced by
him if he cannot show that he
brought the parties to an agreement.
Ropes vs. John Rosenfelds Sons, 79
Pac. 354. Hay vs. Platt 66 Hun. 488.
Baker vs. Thomas, 12 Misc. 432.
Gaty vs. Foster, 18 Mo. App. 639.
Ames vs. McNally, 6 Misc. 93. Wy-
lie vs. Maine Nat'l. Bank, 61 N. Y.
416.
3. One broker who is unsuccess-
ful in effecting a sale does not be-
come entitled to a commission upon
the success of another. Ward vs.
Fletcher, 124 Mass. 224. Crook et al
vs. Forest et al. 116 Ala. 375.
A man's authority to a broker to
sell his property or to find him a pur-
chaser is revokable at any time. Don-
ovan vs. Weed, 182 N. Y. 43-74 N. E.
563. Chambers vs. Seay, 73 Ala. 372.
Coffin vs. Landis, 46 Pa. 426. Gard-
ner vs. Pierce, 116 N. Y. Supp. 155.
5. A lack of good faith must be
shown on part of principal in the evi-
dence to prevent him from revoking
the agency. Neal vs. Lehman, 34 S.
W. 153. Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac. 316.
Sibbald vs. Bethlehem Iron Co. 38
Am. Rep. 441.
6. The duty of a broker consists
in bringing the minds of the vendor
and vendee to an agreement. Bar-
nard vs. Monnot, 34 Barb. 90. Pott
Vs. Turner, 6 Bing. 702.
7. A broker earns his commissions
by making a sale on the terms fixed
by the principal while his authority
continues. Satterthwaite vs. Vree-
land, 3 Hun. 152.
8. A procuring cause, as used in
the sense of a real estate broker pro-
curing for a client a purchaser,
means the original discovery of the
purchaser by the broker, and the
starting of the negotiations by him,
together with the final closing by or
on behalf of his client with the pur-
chaser through the efforts of the
broker. See "Procuring Cause"
Words and Phrases. Ware vs. Don
Passos, 38 N. Y. Supp. 673.
ARGUMENT
The appellant believes that no
more satisfactory general rule can
be laid down than to ascertain: (1)
What did the broker undertake to
do? (2) Has he completed that un-
dertaking within the time and upon
the terms stipulated? (3) If not,
is the default attributable to his own
act or to the interference of the prin-
cipal.
The plaintiff in this case, under
the terms of a written contract,
agreed to procure a purchaser for
the lands of the defendant. By a
purchaser in the law of brokerage is
meant one who is ready, willing and
able to buy. Fultz vs Wimer, 9 Pac.
316. Dowling vs. Morrill, 165 Mass.
491. The above two cases are cited
for the purpose of establishing one
of the essential elements of a pur-
chaser namely that of willingness.
The plaintiff did not procure a pur-
chaser who was willing to buy the
land for the reason that he failed to
reach an agreement with Blanchett
as regards the purchase of the prop-
erty, and after notice of revocation
was given to Blanchett he had ten
days in which to close the deal which
he was unable to do. If Hardesty
were willing to buy the land he would
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have effected an agreement with
Blanchett during this time.
He did not complete the undertak-
ing within the time and upon the
terms stipulated. It was stipulated
in the contract that the defendant re-
served the right to revoke the agency
upon a ten days written notice. The
defendant gave such notice. This
fact is admitted by the plaintiff. It
has also been proven that the prop-
erty was sold by defendant five days
after the plaintiff's authority was re-
voked.
The principal did not interfere in
any way with Blanchett while he was
making negotiations. This fact was
never raised during the trial, so it
may be disposed of without further
comment.
The defendant contends t h a t
where there is a contract in writing
the contract itself must govern. The
contract is complete and is not am-
biguous; for this reason it is n6t ne-
cessary that the court interfere with
its terms, and those terms as they
stand should govern the case.
The celebrated case of Fultz vs.
Wimer, 9 Pac. 316, analagous to the
present case, supports our conten-
tion. This action was commenced by
the plaintiff G. R. Fultz against the
defendant David J. Wimer, to re-
cover the sum of $65, which the
plaintiff claimed was due him from
the defendant for services rendered
by him in selling the defendant's
'farm. Fultz who was a real estate
agent entered into a written contract
with the owner of land (namely, D.
J. Wimer) that his farm should be
left with him for sale for the term of
two months, and that in case of a sale
within that time, whether made by
the agent, the land owner, or others,
the agent is to receive a commission
of five per cent. Fultz took one C.
Galli out and showed him Wimer's
land, and tried to sell it to him at two
different times. Fultz also intro-
duced Galli to Wimer informing him
that Galli wanted to buy his farm.
Galli agreed to buy the farm during
the time allotted Fultz to make the
sale but did not actually buy the land
until the expiration of that time. The
1court held: Upon the pleadings, the
plaintiff is bound by the special con-
tract. Courts can only enforce con-
tracts as the parties themselves made
them. It is doubtless true that Fultz
was instrumental in enabling the de-
fendant to sell his land; but as Fultz
and Weimer had entered into a writ-
ten stipulation as to the terms upon
which Fultz was entitled to commis-
sion, these stipulations must control.
Fultz, failed to find or produce a pur-
chaser who was willing to take the
farm and pay the money within the
time prescribed.
In this case the parties were not
brought to an agreement through the
efforts of the broker. True Hardesty
was introduced to Taylor through the
efforts of Blanchett, but this is all
that was done by him toward effect-
ing an agreement as all his efforts
failed. It is therefore a well estab-
lished fact in law that the broker
cannot claim his commissions on a
sale of realty where he has not
brought the parties to an agreement
even though his principal sells to the
same man with which he had been
negotiating. A similar situation
arose in the case of Sibbald vs. Beth-
lehem Iron Co., reported in 38 Am.
Rep. 441. Here the defendant em-
ployed the plaintiff to sell the steel
rails of the former's manufacture to
the Grand Trunk Ry. Co. Plaintiff
negotiated with the Grand Trunk
Ry. Co., and during such negotiations
was discharged by the defendant.
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The defendant knowing of the pre-
vious negotiations between plaintiff
and aforesaid railway company se-
cured one Evans who later sold steel
rails to the railway company. Plain-
tiff brought suit for his commissions.
The ruling of the court was: "That
the plaintiff had not made a bargain,
he failed to bring buyer and seller to
'an .agreement and therefore is not
entitled to his commissions. A broker
is never entitled to his commissions
for unsuccessful efforts. This is a
well establisheda rule. The broker
may devote his time and labor, and
expend his money with ever so much
of devotion to the interest of his em-
ployer, and yet if he fails, if without
effecting an agreement or accomp-
lishing a bargain, he abandons the
effort, or his authority is fairly and
in good faith terminated, he gains
no right to commissions. And in such
event it matters not that after his
failure, and the termination of his
agency, what he had done proves of
use and benefit to the principal."
It is our contention that the prin-
cipal had the authority to revoke the
agency under the terms stipulated in
the contract and that such agency
was revoked at the time of the sale
of the land in controversy and that
the agent is not entitled to his com-
mission. In the case of Donovan vs.
Weed reported in 182 N. Y. 43 and
745 N. E. 563, the New York Court
held: "A man's authority to a broker
to sell his property or to find him a
purchaser is revocable at any time."
It is only logical to assume that had
the property been left in the agents
hands for an unreasonable length of
time there would have been a sale.
But is the principal bound to tie up
his property in the hands of an agent
just because the agent happens to be
negotiating with some person and
creating no noticeable results as re-
gards the sale of the property? We
think not, and we feel that the learn-
ed court will agree with us upon this
question. In the case of McClare vs.
Paine 49 N. Y. 561 also 10 Am. Re-
,ports 431, the ruling of the court
was: "If the broker fails to effect a
sale within a reasonable time, and
his agency is terminated in good
faith by his principal, who after-
wards consummates the sale, he will
not be entitled to commissions on
uch sale, even though the broker
may have originally introduced such
purchaser."
It is impossible to conceive of a
case where a person of sound mind
would hire a broker merely to pro-
cure an introduction to some person
who might buy some lands he has
for sale. Or the broker merely by
introducing a prospective purchaser
to his principal, and in no way effect-
ing a, sale, to cause the principal to
become liable to him for commis-
sions. The law as regards the du-
ties of a broker has been well stated
in the case of Barnard vs. Monnot,
reported in 34 Barb. 90. In this case
the court held: "The duty of a broker
consists in bringing the minds of the
vendor and vendee to an agreement."
The evidence in this case clearly
establishes the fact that Blanchett
did nothing to aid Taylor in closing
the deal for the sale of his realty af-
ter his discharge. Previous to his
discharge he was unsuccessful in
closing the deal. For the above rea-
sons we, the appellant, contend that
Blanchett was not the procuring
cause of the sale of Taylor's real es-
tate. Under the words "Procuring
Cause" in "Words and Phrases," we
find the following definition, which
is also supported by the case of Ware
vs. Don Passos, a New York case re-
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ported in 38 N. Y. Supp. 673: "A
procuring cause, as used in the sense
of a real estate broker procuring for
a client a purchaser, means the orig-
inal discovery of the purchaser by
the broker, and the starting of the
negotiations by him, together with
the final closing by or on behalf of
his client with the purchaser through
the efforts of the broker."
In concluding, the appellant be-
lieves that he is entitled to a reversal
of the judgment of the trial court on
the following three grounds: (1)
That the broker undertook to pro-
cure a purchaser and failed to do so.
(2) That the broker did not complete
the undertaking within the time and
upon the terms stipulated. (3) The
broker's default can in no way be at-
tributed to an interference of the
principal. Our contention is that
the trial court erred grossly in over-
ruling the appellant's motion for a
new trial.
Wherefore the appellant prays
that the learned Supreme Court of
Notre Dame will remand the case
to the trial court with instructions
to grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted to the Hon-
orable, the Supreme Court of Notre
Dame, Indiana, for just considera-
tion and solution.
Henry W. Fritz,
Att'y. for Appellant.
BRIEF OF WILLIAM S. ALLEN IN CASE OF
TAYLOR VS. BLANCHETT
State of Indiana,
County of St. Joseph, ss
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
Albert B. Taylor, Appellant,
VS.
Earnest M. Blanchett, Appellee.
Brief for Appellee.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action in special as-
sumpsit by which the appellee, plain-
tiff below, sought judgment against
the appellant, defendant below, on a
contract which he alleged he per-
formed, thereby entitling him to
commissions he earned acting under
that contract.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The plaintiff filed a declaration in
the three counts to which the defend-
ant filed a general and special demur-
rer. The court sustained the demur-
rer to the first count and overruled
it as to the other counts.
The second count alleged that the
plaintiff entered into a contract in
writing with the defendant, which
provided that defendant placed his
land with the plaintiff for sale; that
defendant agreed to pay the plain-
tiff one dollar per acre of said real
estate commission out of the first
funds received in payment on ac-
count of such sale or on the exchange
of said property, in case a purchaser
is found of said property is sold
or exchanged through plaintiff,
or through his influence, or if
he assists in any way in the
sale or exchange of said prop-
erty; that defendant reserved the
Iright to withdraw property at any
time by giving a ten day notice in
writing; and that under this contract
Blanchett had introduced one Hard-
esty to the defendant who was ready,
willing and able to buy and that the
property was sold by the defendant
to Hardesty but the commission was
(refused.
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The third count alleged all that the
second count alleged and also that
the price has been paid to the defend-
ant by Hardesty.
The defendant then filed his plea in
two counts. The first count was a
general traverse. In his second
count the defendant alleged that he
had given notice to the plaintiff in
writing of the revocation of the
agency and was therefore not bound
to pay any commission under the
contract, since the sale took place af-
ter such revocation.
To the second count of the plea the
plaintiff filed a demurrer which the
court overruled and the plaintiff then
filed a replication in general denial.
After the trial, the Court returned a
finding for the plaintiff. Defendant
filed a motion for a new trial which
was denied by the court. Judgment
was rendered and this appeal was
brought.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. The general rule-subsequent
negotiation through the owner does
not affect commission since the brok-
er showed that the land was for sale.
Corum vs. Arnold, 137 S. W. 622,
Missouri. Heaton et al. vs. Edwards,
51 N. W. 544, Michigan. Graves vs.
Baines, 14 S. W. 256, Texas. West
Bros. vs. Thompson & Greer, 106 S.
W. 1134, Texas. Pierce vs. Nichols,
110 S. W. 206, Texas.
2. When a broker is employed to
find a purchaser for his principal's
-property on specific terms he is en-
titled to his commissions when he
produces to his principal a person
who is ready, willing and able to buy
on such terms. Handley vs. Shaffer,
59 So. 286, Alabama. Morris vs.
Clark, 80 So. 406, Alabama.
3. Under special contract provid-
ing that the agency may be termin-
ated by a written notice of a certain
number of days, if, after the broker
has introduced a prospective pur-
chaser to the owner of the property,
the owner sends a revocation of au-
thority and later sells to this pur-
chaser, the broker is entitled to com-
missions since he has been the pro-
curing cause of the sale and has com-
p'lied with the contract. Weisels-Ger-
hart Real Estate Co. vs. Epstein, 137
S. W. 326, Missouri. Scott vs. Pat-
terson, 19 S. W. 419, Arkansas. Mont-
gonery vs. Amsler, 122 S. W. 307,
Texas. Wells vs. Andreas, 115 N. W.
792 Wisconsin.
4. A broker earns a commission
where he brings the property which
he is employed to sell to the attention
of a third person and then turns that
person over to his employer and the
property is sold as the result of nego-
tiations between the two so begun.
Johnstone vs. Cochrane, 121 N. E.
531, Massachusetts. Desmond vs.
Stebbins, 5 N. E. 150, Massachu-
setts. Willard vs. Wright, 89 N. E.
559, Massachusetts.
5. Bad faith presumed where
there was revocation after the pur-
Ichaser was found. Cadigan vs. Crab-
tree, 78 N. E. 412, Massachusetts.
Dodge vs. Childers, 151 S. W. 749,
Missouri.
6. Since, at the time of the revoca-
'tion, the agent had negotiations for
a sale pending with a party whom he
had introduced to the owner, and the
owner had himself participated in
such negotiations, and, afterward.
the negotiations are continued, or
within a few days renewed, and con-
summated by the owner in person or
through another, the agent is en-
titled to his commissions. Maddox
vs. Harding, 135 N. W. 1019, Neb-
raska. McCray & Son vs. Pfost, 94
S. W. 998, Missouri. Martin vs. Holly
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10 S. E. 83, North Carolina. Knox
vs. Parker, 25 Pac. 909, Washington.
7. The agent's authority cannot be
revoked as to those acts already per-
formed by him. (Mechem on Agency,
Page 63.)
ARGUMENT
The counsel for the appellant has
based his appeal on the fact that the
defendant Taylor, acting under the
contract, and sending a revocation
of agency in writing to the broker,
had thereby released himself from
any further obligation under the con-
tract.
It is a well known rule in agency
that the "principal cannot revoke the
agent's author!tv as to those acts al-
ready performed by him,"-Mechem
on Agency, Page 63; and the conten-
tion of the counsel for the broker is
that he (Blanchett) had performed
his part of the contract before the
agency was revoked. He was the
procuring cause of the sale because
he introduced Hardesty, the pur-
chaser, to the owner. At the mo-
ment he introduced a purchaser
ready, able and willing to buy, he had
performed his part of the contract
so as to entitle him to his commis-
sion. For the contract provides that
"Taylor agrees to pay to said Blan-
chett one Dollar per acre of said real
estate commission out of the first
funds received in payment on ac-
count of such sale or exchange of
said property (1) in case a pur-
chaser is found, (2) said property
is sold or exchanged through
said Blanchett, (3) through his
influence, (4) if he assists in any
way in the sale or exchange of said
property." Therefore, by complying
with any one of the provisions set
forth, Blanchett could earn his com-
mission and fulfill his part of the
contract which he must do before he
can recover thereon. His commis-
sion after performing any one of the
above provisions could in no way be
affected by any revocation subse-
quent to that time on account of the
fundamental principle of agony
above set forth. And the payment
of the price is not a consideration
Blanchett agreed to fulfill but a con-
dition precedent to the payment of
the commission. The price has been
paid, and consequently, there is noth-
ing to bar the commission.
But the counsel for the appellant
quotes Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac. 316,
a Kansas case under a special con-
tract, to sustain their point. In this
case the broker by a written contract,
was given two months in which to
sell the land but he failed to do so
within that time. Later the owner
sold to the purchaser introduced by
the broker. The court, in that case,
said in substance, that courts can
only enforce contracts as parties
themselves made them; under terms
it was only to be left for two months
with the broker; the broker failed to
perform within time allowed and af-
ter expiration of the contract time
the sale was made by the owner who
then had a right to sell to anyone and
he would not be liable for commis-
sion.
This case is to be distinguished
from the one at bar-first, because
there is a time limit in the contract
in the Kansas case, and secondly, be-
cause the broker was required to sell
the land in that case which he failed
to do within the time given.
But neither of these provisions
was in the present contract which
could be performed in any one of
four ways, and within an indefinite
time. That contract was to sell, in
this one if a purchaser was found he
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was to receive his commission and it
is admitted that he found a purchas-
er. The case is not analogous to the
one at bar nor does the ruling apply
to it.
In Weisels-Gerhart Real Estate
Co., vs. Epstein, 137 S. W. 326, a
Missouri case, the facts in brief are
as follows: The plaintiff, a corpor-
ation, was employed to procure a
purchaser for the residence of the de-
fendant. The contract of agency
was executed by defendant in writ-
ing and it stipulated that the plain-
tiff should have for his commission
2 1-2 per cent of the amount of the
sale made; it conferred an exclusive
agency but stipulated that the au-
thority might be revoked by the de-
fendant on 15 days written notice to
the plaintiff. Immediately the plain-
tiff advertised the property and the
attention of one Mr. Mathes was dir-
ected to it. A member of the firm
spoke to him about it and then Mr.
Mathes inspected the house; then the
broker notified the defendant that he
thad a prospective buyer, and had
opened negotiations with Mr.
Mathes. This was on December 22.
On January 10th defendant notified
the plaintiff in writing that his
agency was revoked. On February
4th an agreement for the sale of the
property was entered into by the de-
fendant directly with Mathes and
during this month the sale of prop-
erty was consummated by the owner.
Broker sued for commissions earned
under this contract.
The Missouri court in holding the
owner liable for commissions said:
"'When the plaintiff acted with reas-
onable diligence, and defendant re-
voked his agency without cause to
make sale to a person called to his at-
tention by the agent, and with whom
the agent was negotiating, to escape
payment of commission, then a right
of recovery appears, for law will not
permit agency to be thus terminated
by the principal in the midst of the
negotiations to the end of defeating
agent's rights. The plaintiff in this
case was the procuring cause of the
sale and can recover his commission
under the contract." This case is
identical with the present one and
the ruling of the court here repre-
sents the settled law on this point.
But the courts have gone even fur-
ther than this in holding brokers en-
titled to commissions in similar
cases.
In Scott vs. Patterson, 53 Ark. 49,
19 S. W. 419, the real estate broker
said to the owner of the land that he
had done all he could to sell the land
to the prospective purchaser and that
he was unable to do so, and that he
"turned her (the prospective pur-
chaser) over" to the owner; that he
might sell her the land if he could.
The owner finally made the sale. He
testified that he had nothing to do
with the selling of the property bntil
the brokers declined to have any-
thing more to do with it.
The court, quoting from Tyler vs.
Parr, 52 Mo. 249, said, "The law is
well settled that in a suit by a real
estate agent for the amount of his
commissions it is immaterial that
the owner sold the property and con-
cluded the bargain. If, after the
property is placed in the agent's
'hands, the sale is brought about or
produced by his advertisements or
exertions, he will be entitled to com-
missions. Or, if the agent introduces
the purchaser or discloses his name
to the owner, and through such in-
troduction or disclosure negotiations
are begun, and the sale of property
is effected, the agent is entitled to his
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commission though the sale be made
by the owner."
This ruling is in effect generally
and has been laid down in the follow-
ing cases similar to the present one:
Wells vs. Andreas, 115 N. W. 792,
Wisconsin. Montgomery vs. Ams-
ler, 122 S. W. 307, Texas. Johnstone
vs. Cochrane, 121 N. E. 531, Massa-
chusetts. Desmond vs. Stebbins, 5
N. E. 150, Massachusetts. Willard
vs. Wright, 89 N. E. 559, Massachu-
setts. Maddox vs. Harding, 135 N.
W. 1019, Nebraska. McCray & Son
vs. Pfost, 94 S. W. 998, Missouri.
artin vs. Holly, 10 S. E. 83, North
!Carolina. Knox vs. Parker, 25 Pac.
909, Washington.
Some courts have gone so far as
to rule that a revocation under such
conditions is in bad faith. In Cadi-
gan vs. Crabtree, 78 N. E. 412, the
Massachusetts Court said: "It per-
haps might be assumed that a brok-
er's authority is revoked in bad faith
where negotiations had been carried
on by the broker for the principal
and had progressed so far at the time
when the broker's authority was re-
voked that he was found to be the
efficient cause in fact of a trade sub-
;equently struck between the prin-
cipal and customer. In such a case it
would seem that the finding that the
broker was the efficient cause of the
trade made includes a finding that
the revocation was in fraud of his
rights." The Missouri court handed
down a similar decision in Dodge vs.
Childers, 151 S. W. 749.
In all of the cases given the revoca-
tion of the agency of the broker has
not affected his right to commission
and some of them have even held that
the right to commission existed where
the contract provided for the sale of
the land by the broker and the per-
formance was by the owner after re-
vocation. But all concur in sustain-
ing the rule that if the contract pro-
vided that the commission shall be
paid if a purchaser is found, subse-
qaent negotiations and sale by the
owner of the land do not take from
the broker his right to commissions,
even though there has been a revoca-
tion under a special contract. In
conclusion the appellee believes that
the decision of the Circuit Court was
correct in awarding a judgment to
the plaintiff broker for his commis-
sions earned under the written con-
tract because he had performed his
part of the contract and no revoca-
tion can affect the agent's authority
as to those acts already performed
by him.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the decision of the lower court be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted to the Hon-
orable, the Supreme Court of Notre
Dame.
William S. Allen,
Attorney for the Appellee.
NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT
Be it Remembered, That, to-wit:
On Monday, September 19, 1921, the
Notre Dame Circuit Court was duly
organized for the year, with Hon.
Francis J. Vurpillat as regular Judge
presiding, and the other officers of
court duly elected, qualified and act-
ing, to-wit: Edwin J. McCarthy,
Clerk of the Court, and Edward J.
Dundon, Sheriff.
Court was opened in due form and
the following proceedings were had
and orders made, to-wit:
In re Jury Commissioners for the
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year 1921-1922: The Court appoints
J. Paul Cullen and James E. Murphy,
two competent persons, residents and
legal voters of Notre Dame, Indiana,
and opposite political affiliations, to
act as Jury Commissioners for the
year 1921-1922, who now come into
open court and are qualified as such
Jury Commissioners.
The following rules of court were
promulgated and ordered to be
spread of record: (Here Insert)
In re Court Stenographer: The
'court now appoints John F. Heffer-
/man to be the official court stenog-
rapher of this court for the ensuing
year, 1921-1922. Comes now said
*Hefferman and qualified as such
stenographer by taking the oath of
office.
CAUSE NO. 23.
John D. Carsons, Administrator,
Estate of Ray Stevens, Decd.
VS.
Charles D. Simpson, and
Edward Williams.
'Edward J. Dundon, and
John Killilea,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Clarence R. Smith, and
William A. Miner,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
(Continued)
The cause being at issue the jury
is empannelled and sworn and the
case submitted to trial.
Trial is begun and the plaintiff's
case in chief is concluded. Defendant
files a motion for a non-suit, which
motion is overruled and an exception
is granted to the defendant.
Defendant begins his case in chief.
Defendant rests his case in chief.
And the trial of this case is con-
cluded. Defendant now files a motion
for a directed verdict, which motion
is overruled and 4n exception is
granted.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered one and two with a re-
quest in writing that each of them be
given to the jury. The defendant also
tenders instructions numbered from
one to six inclusive, with a request in
writing that each and all of them be
given to the jury. The court now in-
dicates which of the instructions will
be granted and which will be re-
fused; which instructions are order-
ed filed and made a part of this rec-
ord without a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retires in charge of
a sworn jury bailiff to deliberate
upon the case and arrive at a verdict.
Come again the jury into open court
with their general verdict, to-wit:
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff,
that he is the owner of the property
described in the complaint, to-wit:
One horse, brown in color, three
years old, white spot on the forehead,
white stocking on the left hind leg, a
slit in one ear; and that the plaintiff
is entitled to the property and the
immediate possession thereof.
"J. P. Brady, Foreman."
Come now the parties by their
counsel and the defendant moves the
court for a non obstante veridicto.
Motion is overruled and defendants
separately except. The defendants
now file separate motions for a new
trial. Court overrules the motions
and the defendants separately ex-
cept.
Court now renders judgment upon
the verdict in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendants, to which the
defendants separately except.
Defendants now pray an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted, and five days are
-given in which to file the general bill
of exceptions. Ten days are given the
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said defendants in which to file their
appeal bond in the sum of $500.00,
with Jerome Dixon and Raymond
Kerns as sureties, which bond so ex-
'ecuted and filed is hereby approved.
CAUSE NO. 24.
James Mansfield
VS.
Daniel O'Connor.
Edwin McCarthy and
Mark R. Healey,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Jos. H. Farley and
K. W. Nyhan,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
Plaintiff shows to the court that on
September 28th, 1921, he filed his
complaint and praecipe for sum-
mons. Return of the sheriff filed.
Plaintiff's complaint in one para-
graph and alleges: "That on and be-
fore the 19th day of October, 1919,
the defendant wrongfully kept and
harbored in the said county and state,
a certain dog which was fierce, vici-
ous and dangerous, and which was
accustomed to attack and bite man-
kind, all of which the defendant well
knew during all of the time that he so
kept and harbored the said dog. That
the defendant wrongfully and negli-
gently allowed the said dog to go at
large without being properly muz-
zled or confined. And that on said
date, while the said defendant so
owned and harbored said dog, and
while he so suffered it to run at large,
the said dog attacked and bit and
wounded the plaintiff, by biting him
three times, tearing and lacerating
the flesh and seriously injuring him
and throwing him to the ground.
That thereby the plaintiff became
became sick and sore and lame, and
so continued for a space of seven
months then next ensuing, and was
prevented during all of that time
from the performance of any service
or doing any business whatsoever,
and that he expended the sum of
$1000.00 in endeavoring to be cured
of said sickness and lameness; and
that in the course of the aforesaid
seven months he was damaged to the
extent of $1,100.00. His salary for
seven months, all to the piantiff's
damage in the sum of $2,100.00.
Wherefore the plaintiff sues and de-
mands judgment for the afore-men-
tioned sum of $2,100.00."
Comes now the defendant by coun-
sel and moves the court to strike out
certain parts of the complaint "fierce,
vicious and dangerous." Motion ov-
erruled, exception taken. Defendant
now files a motion to make the com-
plaint more specific in the descrip-
tion of the dog. Motion sustained.
Plaintiff files amended complaint
describing dog as follows: "Large
grey whippet hound with a long
strong tail, large head and massive
jaws, and mouse-colored eyes."
Defendant files demurrer to the
amended complaint. Demurrer over-
ruled, exception for defendant. Coun-
sel for the defendant files answer in
two paragraphs, -(1) general denial;
(2) confession and avoidance on the
ground that the plaintiff at the time
of his injury was a trespasser upon
the premises of defendant, and that
had no knowledge that defendant
harbored such a dog.
Plaintiff files reply to the second
paragraph of the defendants answer.
Cause being at issue jury empan-
nelled and sworn, and case submitted
to trial. Trial had and concluded.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered from one to three inclusive
together with a request in writing
that each and all of them be given to
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the jury. Defendant also tenders in-
structions numbered from one to
three inclusive with a request in
writing that each and all of them be
given to the jury. The court now in-
dicates which instruction will be
given and which refused, which in-
structions are ordered filed and made
a part of this record without a bill of
exceptions.
Arguments of the counsel are now
heard and the court instructs the
jury, and files the instructions num-
bered from one to seven inclusive,
ordered a part of this record without
a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retire in charge of a
sworn jury bailiff to deliberate upon
the case and arrive at a verdict. Come
again the jury into open court with
their general verdict, to-wit: "We,
the jury, find for the plaintiff and
assess his damages in the sum of
$2,100.00.
"John Killilea, Foreman."
CAUSE NO. 25.
Sadie Thompson, by her Next Friend
VS.
Carl Meyne.
Frank M. Hughes and
Paul Paden,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
J. Paul Schwertly and
Raymond Kerns,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
Comes now the attorneys for the
plaintiff and show to the court that
they filed their complaint and prae-
cipe for summons on October 19th,
1921. Return of the sheriff. Plain-
tiff's complaint in one paragraph and
alleges as follows: "That the said
defendant is indebted to the said
plaintiff in the sum of two dollars per
week for a period of one hundred and
fifty-six weeks, over and above board,
lodging and clothing, for work, labor
and services, rendered by her for the
said defendant'at his special instance
and request, at the said County of St.
Joseph by this plaintiff at divers
times between the first day of July,
1918, and the beginning of this ac-
tion, in and about, carrying on and
conducting the defendant's business
as a household servant and laborer,
doing various kinds of household
work, cleaning, cooking, churning,
milking cows, feeding and carrying
water for the stock, chickens, and
horses, in and about the defendant's
farm in the said county. That the de-
fendant promised to pay the plaintiff
whatever these services were reason-
ably worth. That said work, labor
and services were reasonably worth
two dollars a week, for a period of
156 weeks, amounting to $312.00
over and above board and clothing.
That said sum is wholly due and un-
paid. Wherefore plaintiff prays judg-
ment for three hundred and twelve
dollars."
Comes the defendant and files a
motion to require the plaintiff to sep-
arate her causes of action into sep-
arate paragraphs. Motion overruled,
exception for the defense. Defendant
now moves the court to strike out
certain parts of the complaint as sur-
plusage. Motion sustained. De-
fendants demurrer to the complaint.
Demurrer overruled, and exception.
Defendant files answer in two para-
graphs: (1) general denial; (2) con-
fession and avoidance, that she was
in the house of the defendant and did
work as a member of his family, not
as a servant girl, and that she re-
ceived support and education from
defendant as a member of his family.
Plaintiff files reply to second para-
graph of answer.
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Cause being at issue the jury is
empannelled and sworn, and cause
submitted for trial.
Trial begun and the plaintiff con-
cludes her case in chief. Defendant
moves to non-suit the plaintiff. Mo-
tion overruled, and exception. Trial
concluded.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered one and two with a re-
quest in writing that each of them be
given to the jury. Defendant also
tenders instructions numbered from
one to four inclusive accompanied by
a request in writing that each and all
of them be given to the jury. The
court now indicates which instruc-
tion will be given and which refused,
which in structions are ordered filed
and made a part of this record, with-
out bill of exceptions.
Arguments for the plaintiff and
the defendant are now heard and the
court instructs the jury, and files the
instructions with the clerk and or-
ders that they be made a part of this
record without a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retire in charge of a
sworn jury bailiff to deliberate upon
the case and arrive at a verdict.
Come again the jury into open court
with their general verdict, to-wit:
"We, the jury, find for he defendant
against the plaintiff.
"John Paul Cullen, Foreman."
Edwin J. McCarthy,
Clerk of Court.
JUNIOR MOOT COURT
The following cases were present-
ed to the court by oral argument as
well as briefs upon the hypothetical
state of acts. Only the principal
propositions and the cases or author-
ities supporting them are here re-
ported. These cases will later be de-
veloped and submitted for trial in
the Notre Dame Circuit Court by the
lawyers who argued them in thjs
court. The statements of fact with
propositions and authorities follow:
CAUSE NO. 1
James Milburn
VS.
Willis Harmon
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and the defendant, to-
gether with Samuel Jones and Rob-
ert Benton, were partners, owning
and operating in equal shares the
mercantile establishment known as
the Economy Store in South Bend,
Indiana, a prosperous concern val-
ued at 75,000.
On July lsL, 1920, plaintiff sug-
gested the sale to him by the defend-
ant of defendant's share in said con-
cern; and the defendant then actual-
ly offered to sell to plaintiff for the
sum of $20,000 his undivided share
in the concern. On July 5th, follow-
ing, the plaintiff came to defendant
and asked him to hold the offer open
till the 1st day of August, ensuing.
Defendant, not willing to hold the
offer open for that length of time be-
cause, as he said, he had another
chance to sell, plaintiff offered and
defendant accepted fifty dollars to
hold the offer open till August 1st.
On July 15th, in a readjustment of
the partnership, Robert Smith sold
out to the defendant his undivided
interest and Jones also transferred
his interest to another.
On July 30th, the plaintiff went to
the defendant to accept the offer
which was to expire on August 1st,
and then and there tendered to de-
fendant $20,000 and demanded the
transfer to him by the defendant of
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the latter's undivided interest in the
Economy Store, which the defendant
refused -to do, not offering to deliver
to plaintiff any part of his interest
therein.
Plaintiff brings his tender into
court and in his actkun seeks judg-
ment for damages for the breach of
the alleged contract.
Who is entitled to recover?
Edward J. Lennon and
Edmund C. Tschudi,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
A partner's share is definite at all
times-what he would take upon dis-
solution of the partnership. Mech-
em's Elements of Partnership; Sin-
delar vs. Walker, 137 Ill. 4-27 N. E.
59-31 Am. St. Rep. 353; Nenaugh vs.
Whitehall, 52 N. Y. 146-11 Am. Rep.
693. Plaintiff paid a consideration
for an option to buy and the right to
buy defendant's partnership interest
at any time within the stipulated per-
iod. 6 R. C. L. Contracts; Thompson
vs. Bescher, (N. C.) 97 $. E. 654;
Murphy-Thompson vs. Reid, 101 S.
W. 964. Unexpected hardship or in-
convenience in performance no de-
fense or excuse. I. R. C. L. 6; Marx
vs. Kilby Locomotive & Mach. Wks.,
50 So. 136; Ptacek vs Pisa, 83 N. E.
221; Cotrell & Son vs. Smokeless Fuel
Co., 184 Fed. 594.
John C. Cochrane and
Linus C. Glotzbach,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff knew fifteen days before
accepting that defendant had acquir-
ed another partner's interest since
making his offer to sell his own, for
notice thereof is required by the law
of partnership. Eagle vs. Butcher,
67 Am. Dec. 343. There was no mu-
tuality of contract or meeting of the
minds in plaintiff's acceptance and
defendant's offer. Eggleston vs.
Wagner, (Mich.) 10 N. W. 37-13 N.
W. 522.
CAUSE NO. 2.
Charles Slaggert
VS.
John H. Barrett
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, John H. Barrett,. was a
stock buyer of 20 years experience,
engaged in buying stock on the hoof
throughout the country, particularly
in St .Joseph County, Indiana. On
January 15th, 1921, in company with
Jake Adams, an employee, of exper-
ience in judging cattle, the defendant
came to the country home of plaintiff
and negotiated with him for the pur-
chase of 20 head of Hereford steers.
Defendant and Adams inspected the
steers and offered plaintiff $2,000 for
them, which offer plaintiff agreed to
accept. It was also agreed that
plaintiff was to deliver the steers to
defendant in South Bend, Indiana, on
the morning of January 16th, 1921.
On January 16th, about 10 o'clock
a. m., plaintiff brought the steers to
South Bend, to the stock yards,
which was the accustomed place for
delivery of stock, and here met the
defendant who refused to accept the
delivery or to pay the purchase price,
giving as reason that he feared the
steers might be infected with the hoof
and mouth disease then prevalent in
the community. Plaintiff insisted on
delivery and acceptance of the steers,
stating to the defendant that he well
knew all about the disease prevalent
in the country at the time he agreed
to purchase the cattle; that he and
his man had inspected the steers
fully at the time of the agreed pur-
chase; that the steers and none of
them were affected by the disease,
and that he, defendant must keep his
contract. Plaintiff then formally of-
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fered to deliver the steers and de-
manded of defendant the agreed pur-
chase price of $2,000. Defendant re-
fused.
Plaintiff was compelled to return
the steers to his home, and to sell
them in the open market for $300
less than had been agreed upon, and
for this $300 and the damages plain-
tiff brings action.
Frank J. Kelly and
Albert J. Ficks,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
The doctrine of caveat emptor ap-
plies to defendant's purchase. Sweet
vs. Colgate, 11 Am. Dec. 266; 25 Am.
Dec. 276; ;35 L. R. A. (NS) 271. De-
livering the cattle at the place agreed
upon by the defendant constitutes
delivery. 6 R. C. L. 322. Plaintiff ful-
ly peformed his contract. 52 L. R.
A. 260; 31 S. E. 525; 2 N. E. 387;
72 N. W. 752; 53 L. R. A. 108; 18
Atl 90; 19 So. 340.
Thomas J. Keating and
Matthew McEnery,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an oral contract for the
purchase of goods of the value of
more than fifty dollars, and is unen-
forcible under the statute of frauds.
2 Starkie on Evidence. 490; 22 N. E.
349; 64 N. W. 952; 96 Pac. 870; 62
Ind 485.
CAUSE NO. 3
Richard B. Swift
VS.
Henry W. Kearnes
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Kearnes, met plaintiff,
Swift, and, in conversation stated to
Swift that he had heard considerable
about Swift's horse, named Swift
Richard, and of racing stock. A few
weels later, August 1, 1921, Swift
directed and mailed to Kearnes the
following letter:
"Grand Rapids, Mich.,
"Aug. 1, '21
Mr. Henry W. Kearnes,
South Bend, Indiana.
"Dear Sir:-
"Referring to our recent conversa-
tion about my horse, am writing to
say that you can buy the horse, Swift
Richard, for One Thousand Dollars,
you paying me that amount in cash
or executing your promisory note for
that sum payable to me in thirty
days.
(Signed)
"Yours truly,
"R. B. Swift."
On August 15, 1921, in reply to
Swift's letted, Kearnes sent the fol-
lowing letter:
"South Bend, Ind.,
"Aug. 15th, 1921.
"Mr. Richard B. Swift,
"Grand Rapids, Mich.
"Dear Sir:-
"I have your letter of the 1st
instant. I like your horse pretty
well, as I stated when I last saw you.
And your proposition does not seem
high, if the horse meets my expecta-
tion. I don't want to buy him, how-
ever, until I can look him over care-
fully. We might come to a deal then.
I'll think the matter over.
"Yours very truly,
(Signed) "H. W. Kearnes."
On the 30th day of August, 1921,
Mr. Swift sent the horse in charge of
his keeper and driver, Mr. Charles
Owens. to the defendant Kearnes,
with instructions to take the horse
to Kearnes. Upon arriving in South
Bend, Indiana, Owens drove the horse
to the home of Kearnes and told him
that Swift had directed him to do so.
Whereupon Kearnes, after "sizing
up" the horse, said "Well, he really
looks good. I believe you can leave
him Owens."
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On September 1st, 1921, Swift,
wrote Kearnes for the $1,000, and
Kearnes replied: "I did not buy the
horse; you may have him any time."
Next, Kearnes, on Sept. 3rd, offered
to return the horse, but Swift refused
to accept the return of the horse and
brought action.
Lyle E. Miller and
Chas. E. Robitaille,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
There was contract offer and ac-
ceptance in terms of offer, Lockwood
vs. Robbins, 125 Ind. 398; in re Greis,
308; Stagg vs. Compton, 81 Ind. 171;
Train vs. Gold (Mass.) 28 Am. Dec.
374; Sturgis vs. Robbins, 28 Am.
Dec. 374. Delivery of the horse takes
the case out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. Coffin vs. Brad-
bury. 3 Idaho 770-95 Am. St. Rep.
37; Hinkle vs. Fischer, 104 Ind. 84-
3 N. E. 624.
Edward W. Gould and
Eugene M. Hines,
Attorneys for Defendant.
There was not sufficient acceptance
and delivery to take the contract out
of the statute of frauds. Defendant
took possession of the horse for pur-
pose of "carefully examining" him
and did not intend acceptance by
merely "sizing him up." Clark on
Contracts, pages 121, 127; 1915 L. R.
A. 824: 4 L. R. A. (NS) 177; 29 L.
R. A. 431.
CAUSE NO. 4
Thomas Watkins and Jacob
Hines as Watkins & Hines, Partners,
Vs.
Jonathan Reidenhor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff are doing a mercan-
tile business as a partnership, oper-
ating under the firm name of Wat-
kins & Hines. Their place of business
is corner of Colfax and Michigan
Streets in the City of South Bend,
Indiana.
On August 1, 1921, the defendant
purchased of the plaintiff 500 sacks
of stock food and gave his note for
$200, payable at The St. Joseph Loan
& Trust Company, Sept. 15, 1921,
with 6 per cent interest and attprney
fees.
Defendant owris and operates a
large stock farm in St. Joseph Coun-
ty, Indiana, where he resides, about
ten miles from South Bend. De-
fendant opened and used part of one
sack of the stock food and decided
that it was no good. Accordingly he
had the stock food examined by a
man who presumed to know the in-
gredients of such foods and experi-
enced in handling and mixing them
for ten years. Several sacks were
thus examined and the defendant,
upon the advice of this inspector, a
Mr. James Cunningham, concluded
that the stock food was "no good,"
and called the plaintiff at their place
of business by telephone and told
them that "the stock food you sold
me is no good," and that he could not
use it.
The note having matured and not
having been paid, plaintiff brings ac-
tion on the note.
The stock food is, in fact, no good
as a stock food, and defendant's pur-
chase is hardly worth team hire to
carry it back.
Francis J. Galvin and
Daniel D. Lynch,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
The doctrine that articles sold for
food are impliedly warranted to be
sound and wholesome extends only
to food sold for human consumption
and not to food for animals. National
Cotton Oil Co. vs. Young, 85 S. W.
42; Lukes vs. Freund, 41 Am. Rep.
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429. The law presumes that a buyer
who fails to exact an express war-
ranty relies on his own judgment.
Davis vs. Murphy, 14 Ind. 158; Court
vs. Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440.
J. Stanley Bradbury and
Joseph W. Nyikos,
Attorneys for Defendant.
There was an implied warranty
that the stock food was reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it was
ordered, buyer relying on seller's
judgment. Sales Act, Sec. 15; Hun-
ter vs. State, 73 Am. Dec. 168; Coyle
vs. Baum, 41 Pac. 389; Houston vs.
Cotton Oil Co. vs. Tramwell, 72 S. W.
244; Hauk vs. Berg, 105 S. W. 1176;
Best vs. Flint, 5 Atl. 192.
CAUSE NO. 5.
Andrew W. Grayham
VS.
The Indiana Traction Company,
an Indiana Corporation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff was driving his Packard
car, going east in Colfax street,
South Bend, Indiana. Plaintiff's son
was driving the car while plaintiff
himself rode in the rear seat. As the
car approached Michigan street, de-
fendant's car driven by its servants
was also approaching Colfax street.
Plaintiff and his son, expecting the
defendant's car to be brought to a
full stop before crossing Colfax
street, continued to drive their Pack-
ard east. Defendant's servants did
not stop the street car, but continued
to travel across Colfax street.
Plaintiff, seeing the defendant's
car coming on without the accustom-
ed stop at the crossing, and fearing
that a collision was inevitable, to
avoid injury to himself, leaped from
his Packard car and was thereby
thrown violently against the stone
pavement and street, sustaining a
fractured shoulder, broken arm,
bruised face and cut scalp, and a con-
cussion of the brain. Plaintiff's son,
upon seeing the street car coming on
without a stop, and intending to
avoid a collision, put on the accelera-
tor and succeeded in getting the
Packard across the street car track
an instant or two before the street
car passed, thus averting injury and
damage to himself and his car.
Plaintiff paid $500.00 for medical
and surgical aid, $500.00 hospital
charges, was confined to the hospital
and his home for a period of three
months, losing $750 salary, and he
suffered pain and anguish, for all of
which he brings action against the
defendant street car company for
$2000.00.
Plaintiff's action is founded on the
theory that it was defendant's duty
to bring its street car to a full stop
before attempting to cross Colfax St.
Of course, had the plaintiff remained
in his car, he would have averted the
injuries just as his son did. And,
again, the son, by putting on the
accelerator and suddenly starting or
jerking the Packard forward, really
caused the plaintiff to be thrown to
the ground.
Jerome D. Blievernicht and
James P. Wilcox,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff had equal right with de-
fendant to use of crossing and, hav-
ing reached the crossing first, had
right to pass before the street car.
12 Ohio St. 22. Defendant violated
the city ordinance. South Bend Ordi-
nances, page 208, Secs. 6 and 7. De-
fendant's servants were negligent in
operating street car. 107 Pac. 964;
10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 391.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
Henry J. Lauerman and
Joseph E. O'Brien,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff had no reason to believe
that defendant's car would stop, and
is guilty of contributory negligence.
Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. vs. Murray,
(Ohio), 30 L. R. A. 508; Chicago
City Ry. Co. vs. Stramphel, 110 Ill.
App. 482; Foulk vs. Wilmington City
Ry. Co., 60 Atl. 973; McCarthy vs.
Consolidated Ry. Co., 63 Atl. 725;
Mitchell vs. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.
E. 354. Plaintiff placed himself in a
perilous position in assuming that
street car would stop and in attempt-
ing to pass. 157 N. W. 860; 32 So.
797; 51 Am. Dec. 395; 13 Ill. App. 91.
ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
EDITORIALS
WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH THE LAW
REPORTER?
The Law Reporter is all right.
Just a little late, that's all-the No-
vember issue appearing in February.
The Reporter, which is printed by
OUR SUNDAY VISITOR at Hunt-
ington, Indiana, always had been
shipped to Notre Dame by parcel
post. But, for some unknown reason,
the April, 1921 number was sent by
express to South Bend. The local ex-
press office lost one of the two par-
cels. After three months of futile
complaint, correspondence and claim-
filing, the lost parcel of reporters ex-
posed itself to the local express com-
pany, which then actually delivered
it, after commencement. This un-
avoidably delayed the publication of
the June Reporter, which also came
during vacation. As a result the
Alumni received the April and June
Reporters in September, after the
return of the students.
This situation made collection of
alumni subscriptions impossible. A
deficit of two hundred and twenty-
five dollars occurred to meet which
has caused the delay in resuming pub-
lication of the Reporter till now. Ad-
vanced subscriptions of the students
are used to meet the alumni delin-
quency, which we feel is due wholly
to the situation stated, and which we
hope may soon be cheerfully met by
prompt payment on the part of the
Old Boys of the Law School.
A reorganization of the Reporter
Staff has been made, and hereafter
the Reporter will appear upon a di-
vided responsibility. With the edi-
tor-in-chief, four more chief editors
have been associated, Clarence Man-
ion, John J. Buckley, Vincent B. Pa-
ter and Aaron H. Huguenard. This
will make possible not only the im-
provement of the existing depart-
ments but the addition of others, val-
uable and much desired.
One new feature, a section entitled
"Class-icks," appears with this issue.
Only a sample, however, of its con-
templated character is exposed. This
department will be edited by our gen-
ial and talented upper-classman of
the Law School, candidate for the J.
D. and professor in the College of
Arts and Letters, Clarence Manion.
The student Editorial Section will be
in charge of the popular and pro-
gressive Ph. M. and prospective J. D.,
John J. Buckley. The News Section
of the student and alumni depart-
ments will be in charge, respectively
of Aaron H. Huguenard and Vincent
B. Pater, whose successful and ag-
gressive college activities are well
known.
We hasten to assure our readers
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that the beautiful garb which the
Reporter has heretofore worn will
not be discarded for any velvet
knickerbockers, on account of the ec-
centricities and proclivities added to
the editorial staff.
Please gleefully offer an immed-
iate transfusion of your golden blood
to the N. D. Law Reporter in its pres-
ent aenemic condition, and watch the
Reporter grow bigger, better, bright-
er and "beautifuller." Gee, how that
last bee did sting. E. I. C.
PROF. TIERNAN'S BOOK
Prof. John P. Tiernan's book,
"Conflict of Laws," is one of the
most comprehensive works that has
ever been written on this subject.
Prof. Tiernan has succeeded in doing
what no other writer on this difficult
and technical subject has been able
to do; he has boiled down and con-
densed the vast field of knowledge on
this subject into a volume of a little
more than one hundred pages. To
the student of law, this is a relief.
After wading through volumes con-
sisting of from six hundred to eight
hundred pages, it is a great pleasure
to encounter Prof. Tiernan's little;
book. This pleasure is enhanced by
the fact that the book is complete in
every detail. Prof. Tiernan deserves
great credit for this treatise. He is
the first member of the Notre Dame
Law College to engage in this field of
work. It is a wonderful thing for a
Technical or Professional school to
have on its Faculty men who have
written books on the subjects which
they teach. It is a means of build-
ing up faith in the students and it is
a source of confidence to the prospec-
tive students. The Law Reporter
takes this opportunity to thank Prof.
Tiernan for his wonderful work and
it hopes that he will continue in this
writing. J. J. B.
THE RESEARCH COURSE
The course in Legal research work
has been intensified at Notre Dame
due to the efforts of The American
Law Book Publishing Co. This com-
pany is the publisher of "Corpus
Juris," the most comprehensive and
profound work ever compiled on the
general law. In order to promote
interest in the work, the Publishing
Company has offered a set of these
books to the man who shows the
greatest proficiency in using them.
This prize is enough to arouse inter-
est in any contest, but when the ad-
ditional fact of the information re-
ceived is taken into consideration,
the value of the course is greatly in-
creased. Every step of the work is
practical. It is something that every
Lawyer should know and must know
if he is to be successful. The method
of Briefing which the Publisher's
have prepared is a legal education in
itself. Building up a case is like
writing the plot of a drama. The
value of the finished product depends
largely on the skill with which the
worker has used his tools. In Legal
work, the collection of general law
cases are the tools. Knowledge of
their use means success; ignorance
means failure. The Law Reporter
advises every student of the Law to
get acquainted with this practical
side of the Law Course. The student
will feel the value of this work, as
soon as he begins to prepare for ad-
mission to the Bar. The knowledge
contained in Corpus Juris is accur-
ate and complete. It is arranged in
a systematic manner and it will aid
the student to group his knowledge
systematically. It will cause him to
remember a great portion of the law
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by means of association. No man
can work faithfully on this course
without reaping a valuable reward.
J. J. B.
THE DEAN
For some reason or other, a fresh-
man found himself in Sorin Hall the
other day, and being there he decided
to look over the pictures before leav-
ing. He had spent some thirty min-
utes gazing at the heroes of other
days when he came upon a picture of
the Class of '91.
He was about to pass it over cur-
sorily when he saw "Francis J. Vur-
pillat" written in a striking hand
under the likeness of one of the grad-
uates. "Why, there's the Dean of
the Law School," he said uncon-
sciously. "The Judge hasn't been out
of school thirty years already, has
he?"
To those of us who have to look a
score and a half of years ahead, the
time seems interminably long. But
if it were our privilege to look back
on a career of thirty years like that
which Judge Vurpillat has had, it
would not be an exaggeration to say
three decades of years seem no more
than as many months.
In a recent address, a certain na-
tionally-known educator said that too
many Catholic young men were wil-
ling to follow and not enough to lead;
too many Catholic lawyers were prac-
ticing before the bar and not enough
were sitting on the bench; too many
were sacrificing principle for the sake
of monetary reward. Of course, he
couched his ideas in elaborate lan-
guage but that was the substance of
them.
As we sat there, listening to the
wonderful address, we couldn't help
thinking about the Judge and how
his accomplishments measured up to
the ideals set by the eminent speaker.
Indeed, it seemed as though the edu-
cator had rgulated his standards ac-
cording to the Judge's career, so
closely does that career conform to
them.
Quite often do we read in story
books about men whose live§ are per-
fect, whose steps to success have
been certain and well-defined, whose
achievements with time have become
greater. But seldom do we have the
pleasure to witness such successes in
actual life. In the case of Judge Vur-
pillat, we have an exceptional exam-
ple.
He was out of school but a short
time when he was elected Prosecuting
Attorney of the Forty-fourth Judicial
Circuit of Indiana. He served in
that capacity for three consecutive
terms. For several years he was
County Attorney of Pulaski County,
and City Attorney of Winamac.
In 1908, he was elected Judge of
the Forty-fourth Judicial Circuit, en-
joying the unique distinction of being
the youngest circuit judge ever chos-
en in Indiana. Lack of space pre-
vents any detail on the decisions of
Judge Vurpillat. Suffice to say that
many of them, such as the Kankakee
Meander Land Case and Proctor
Regulation Act Case, are landmarks
in Indiana law today.
From the bench, the Judge came
to Notre Dame where he has been
Dean of the Hoynes College of Law
since 1913. Under his administra-
tion, the Law School has grown
from a few rooms in the basement of
Sorin Hall to one of the best build-
ings on the campus.
In recognition of the invaluable
services which Judge Vurpillat has
rendered the University, the Class of
'22 met in November and gave him
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
the highest honor within their power
-the Dome dedication. A. H. H.
DOME DEDICATION
It is with pride that the Law
School regards the action of the Sen-
ior Class in the dedication of "The
Dome." The seniors of 1922 decided
to give this singular honor to Judge
Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean of thej
Hoyne's College of Law. Judge Vur-
pillat has worked long and faithful-
ly to build up the Law College. He
took control of the School after the
retirement of Colonel Hoynes and he
has made a wonderful success of the
task. It was mainly through the ef-
forts of Dean Vurpillat that a separ-
ate building was turned over to the
Law School. The Jadge has worked
unceasingly to build up a good, prac-
tical library. Due to his initiative,
many new courses have been added
to the Law schedule. Judge Vurpil-
lat has, by his faithful work and his
wonderful knowledge of the Law
been able to win the confidence and
respect of every student in the col-
lege. He has always treatedI his stu-
dents as men and they in turn have
always acted like men. No man in
the Law College shrinks from en-
countering the Judge either as Dean
or as a friend. They know that they
will always receive the credit that is
due them or the discredit that they
may deserve. The Judge is bluff and
direct and he always does as he says.
His word is an assurance that a thing
will be done or will not be done. The
men respect him for this quality.
They love him as a friend; they re-
spect him as a teacher; and they hon-
or him as a Dean. It is therefore,
with pride that they regard the ac-
tion of the Senior class. By honor-
ing Judge Vurpillat with the Dome
dedication, the Senior Class has hon-
ored the Law School and by honor-
ing the Hoynes' College of Law they
have honored themselves. J. J. B.
STUDENT GOVERNMENT
Student government has, for the
first time made its appearance at No-
tre Dame. Up to date, the Faculty
of the University has always main-
tained a strict paternal attitude in
this regard. The men have been re-
garded merely as children and fre-
quently they' have acted like irre-
sponsible youngsters. However, a
portion of the University is now go-
ing to enjoy self-government. The
moment is a critical one both for the
Faculty and for the students. The
Faculty must prepare for a good
many changes and it must stand
ready to give the men at the head of
the movement a free hand. The stu-
dents must not be too hasty in con-
demning either the movement or the
men who have been elected to head
the movement. Hasty action on eith-
er side will ruin any chance that the
movement may have. Bad faith on
either side means failure. Each side
must be prepared to give up some-
thing. The Faculty must keep hands
off and give the governing board a
free hand. The students must learn
to stand behind the decisions of their
representatives and they must do all
in their power to promote the wel-
fare of the new organization. It will
be a novel sight to watch the develop-
ment of the student control move-
ment. It means evolution. It means
that the student who has criticized so
long and so often is to be given a
chance to better conditions. It
means that the responsibility for suc-
cess or failure is in his hands. Stu-
dent government is a horse that can
be ridden to death. However, we
hope that this will not be the case at
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Notre Dame. We hope that the stu-
dents will have enough foresight to
see that they are the ones who re-
ceive the benefit. We hope that they
will be broad-minded enough to up-
hold the decisions of the court that
they have initiated. If the students
play fair and if the faculty plays
fair, the student government move-
ment is bound to succeed. We honor
the men who have labored to bring
the movement into being at Notre
Dame and we wish each member of
the rules committee every success.
J. J. B.
VALUE OF REPORTER
We urge every Law student to sub-
scribe for the Law Reporter. This is
a paper for the Law students and it
is practical in every respect. The
Law Reporter reports every case that
is filed in the courts of Notre Dame.
It serves to guide the student through
his court work and it is valuable re-
view. The reporter serves to solidify
the work that proceeds so rapidly in
our courts. Many of the happenings
in Court are too swift to be grasped.
They can always be found in the Law
Reporter. The Law Reporter might
well be said to do for the student
what the Case books do for the Law-
yer. The Attorney can read a case
and get everything out of it. But
many of the minor steps are not re-
ported and are missed by the student.
In the Law Reporter, these steps are
always to be found. The editors of
the Law Reporter realize that the
student must know these steps if he
is to be able to grasp intelligently the
cases that he reads. Therefore, read
the Law Reporter and you will be
better equiped to battle with the
case books. Besides the cases report-
ed from the Moot Courts, there are
articles in the Reporter of interest to
the student of Law. Many interest-
ing cases or questions are discussed
which aid the student in grasping the
Law. Besides being a help to the
student, the Law Reporter will also
benefit the Lawyer. Many of the
cases treated in the Moot Courts are
thoroughly developed and the cita-
tions are given. These will prove of
help to the Attorney who is often too
pushed for time to be able to look up
every question in which he is inter-
ested. Besides this, the Law Report-
er serves to act as a link between the
Alumni and the Hoynes College of
Law. The columns of the Law Re-
porter are open alike to the Alumnus
and the student. Take advantage of
this and use them. Subscribe to the
Law Reporter and help it in its strug-
gle to benefit you. J. J: B.
WHY NOT THE LAW SCHOOL?
While Notre Dame is planning to
build up its Commerce School and
its Engineering School, we believe
that it should remember the Hoynes'
College of Law. One of the high of-
ficials of the University once said
that he regarded the Law school as
the only Post Graduate school on the
campus. However, if the Law School
is to continue to stand out like this,
it is necessary that it receive some
of the benefit of the endowment. The
Law School needs more professors
and it needs a bigger and more com-
plete library. The Law Library con-
tains the tools of the lawyer. The
library room is his shop and the
books are his tools. To be successful,
the lawyer must have tools that are
apace with the times. The reporters
must be up to date and the reference
books must be the best obtainable. It
is true that the Faculty of the Law
school is a good one, but if it is to
give the best that it has, more pro-
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fessors must be secured. It is possi-
ble to kill a willing horse by running
it to death. If a few Professors are
forced to handle all of the classes
either they will become ill or else the
quality of their work must fall. Eith-
er of these things would be a disas-
ter. Therefore, we believe that a
portion of the endowment fund
should be set aside to build up the
Law School. The Hoynes College of
Law has always been an honor to No-
tre Ddme and we believe that every-
thing should be done to perpetuate
this fact. It is true that the Law
school is not the only one that needs
help, but we believe that while the
rush is on to help the other schools
the needs of the Law College should
not be forgotten. J. J. B.
CLASS-ICKS
AN ARGUMENTATIVE GENERAL
DENIAL
The Judge to his pleading class-
Gentlemen: The following case fur-
nishes a good example of the argu-
mentative general denial:
A complaint was made against a
Dutchman that his dog had bitten the
complainant's child; to which the
Dutchman answered:
In de first place, dat dog he don't
bite your child; in de second place,
dat dog, he dont got no teeth; and in
the third place dat dog he aint my
dog in the first place.
ON ONE COLONEL AND TWO
JUDGES
Judge F. to his class: "A young
lawyer of South Bend was called to
the jail to counsel an imprisoned
client. After hearing the prisoner's
statement, he said, with a display of
legal wrath, 'Why! they can't put
you in jail for that.' 'Well, h-
exclaimed the client, 'I'm here just
the same.'
Judge V. to the same class: 'Did the
Judge tell you that as original?'
'Sure,' answered the class in chorus.
'Well,' said Judge V., 'I've been per-
petrating that as my own for six
years. And now, to expose the Judge,
and to plead confession and avoid-
ance for myself, and to give honor to
whom honor is due, I want to say that
that old nut was cracked by the Colo-
nel thirty years ago.'
LAW SCHOOL NEWS.
The Legal Recearch Training
Course.
There may be a bag of gold at the
end of the rainbow, but, generally
speaking, such is not the case at the
end of a law education. "Impecuni-
osity" and "young lawyer" have
practically become synonyms in our
language, and the more unkind writ-
ers constantly flaunt this fact before
the struggling young attorney.
The American Law Book Company
of Brooklyn, however, has taken a
very praiseworthy step to encourage
the budding barrister who will leave
'school in an impoverished condition.
'In brief, the move is this: Recogniz-
ing the fact that it is most important
to know where to find the law, the
Law Book Company has prepared
eight sets of questions, twenty ques-
tions to each set.
These questions are to be answered
by references to Cyc-Corpus Juris.
'The student is given a month in
which to answer each series. The
course is required of every Junior
'and Senior. To the one answering
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the entire one hundred sixty ques-
tions most correctly a set of Cyc-
Corpus Juris will be given as a prize.
It has been an exceptional year for
the University, and especially for the
Hoynes College of Law. Two years
ago or so, we read an article by Del-
mar Edmondson in the Reporter,
called Notre Dame's Legal Re-
naissance. It was an interesting,
well-written piece of work, and we
lawyers liked it because, in a way, it
Was a defense of our college. That
was when the status of the school
was questioned. We still like it, not
because of its eulogistic nature, but
Tather because it marks the begin-
ning of the growth of the Law
School, which today is the largest on
the campus. We had a delightful ad-
mission of this last November when
the Law Club held its smoker. Father
Burns was the speaker of the even-
ing, and when he saw the large
crowd, he showed genuine surprise
and asked the chairman whether all
those present were bona fide law
students.
The year started off with remark-
able punctuality. Even Doc Hughes
and Paul Schwertley were here a day
ahead of time, and Judge Farabaugh
told us that the sedate John Brady
was on the campus, September 1st.
It is hardly necessary to go further
after giving you the foregoing, al-
most incredible facts.
It was quite a trick to register this
year. There were no less than fifty-
seven steps to go through, and the
more nervous of us suffered severe
breakdowns. The end of our enroll-
ment journey, however, was worth
the terrifying preliminary procedure,
for there was the invincible smile
and sincere handshake of Judge Vur-
pillat.
The faculty staff has been changed
somewhat. Prof. James B. Costello
has retired from teaching and re-
turned to his home in Hazelton, Pa.,
where he is engaged in the general
practice of law. He carries with him
the best wishes of his former stu-
dents.
Hon. Samuel Parker, A. B., of the
firm of Anderson, Parker, Crabill &
Crumpacker, South Bend, Ind., was
added to the staff, but certain un-
foreseen difficulties have prevented
his assuming active duties in the law
school this year.
Vitus G. Jones, Litt. B., LL. B.,
who was to teach the course in Ab-
stracts, has had to undergo a serious
operation and will not be able to
teach before next year.
Arthur Hunter, Ph. B., LL. B., is
now teaching Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure.
Edwin Fredrickson, LL. B., has
been given the course in Contracts,
along with that of Partnership, and
Bills and Notes.
Judge Vurpillat is teaching a class
in Administrative Law. This is a
new course for the law college, and
one which many schools are giving
only in their post-graduate years.
Prof. John Tiernan has had his
first text published. It is Conflict of
Laws (Callaghan & Co., $2.00). Con-
gratulations!
The Law Club re-organized early
in the year. Vincent Pater, '22, was
chosen president; Eddie Hogan, '23,
vice-president; John Heffernan, '22,
secretary, and Frank Donahue, '24,
treasurer. The contest between Ray
Kearns and Jim Murphy for ser-
geant-at-arms was most spirited.
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The final count resulted in a victory
for the lad from Bridgeport.
One big smoker was given in No-
vember. A feature of the affair was
that there was no assessment. Need-
less to say, the entire club was pre-
sent. Many still talk about the delici-
ous cider. Plans are now being laid
for the annual banquet.
A new addition to the Law School
has been the librarian, Prof. Frank
Whitman. Perhaps it is out of order
to give any compliments at such an
eai'Iy date, but we sbadi say this: it is
a genuine pleasure to go into the Li-
brary and note the order prevailing.
"Gentlemen of the Law Club:
"The veneer of civilization is thin,
and it is the primeval instinct of ev-
ery man to carry a weapon." Thus
began the sonorous speech of John
Buckley, Ph.B., A.M., and embryonic
LL.B. man, which resulted in the
adoption of canes by the Senior law-
yers.
The custom of the lawyer's carry-
ing a cane is one so old and venerable
that the "memory of man runneth
not to the contrary ;" yes, even ante-
dating Chinese civilization and going
back to cave-man days when might
was law and every man was his own
lawyer.
Homecoming Day, 1921, marked
the formal appearance of the cane on
the campus and the making of com-
ments, pro and con, on the part of
the other colleges. The canes have
greatly increased the popularity of
many of the men. Especially, has
this been true of Chet Wynne and
Judge Carberry, who handle the ap-
pendages with the debonair grace of
a Chesterfield.
The Law Library has been in-
creased by some very valuable addi-
tions. Among the new books which
have been placed on the shelves re-
cently is a set of thirty volumes of
the American and English Enceylo-
pedia of Law, the gift of James P.
Fogarty, LL.B., who has law offices
in the Finance Bldg., Philadelphia.
T. Paul McGannon, LL.B., 1907, is
the donor of 194 volumes of the New
York state reports. Paul is at pre-
sent deputy attorney general of New
York.
We have also received the Illinois
decisions, consisting of 130 volumes
Supreme Court, and 185 Appellate
Court Reports, from the Hon. Chas.
Craig, LL.D., of the Supreme Bench
of that state.
It would be cheap for us to attempt
to voice our gratitude for these gifts.
We can only say that we do not know
of a better way in which these men
could have helped the alma mater.
While most of us on the campus
were indulging in the excesses of a
free day, Nov. 11, 1921, Clarence
Manion packed his grip and journey-
ed to Dyersville, Iowa, where he was
the speaker of the Armistice Day
Celebration. The affair was under
the auspices of the American Legion,
and rumors drifting "back home"
have it that our Kentucky classmate
acquitted himself in his usual won-
derful form.
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ALUMNI DEPARTMENT
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW.
Leo J. Hassenauer, LL.B. '20.
The recent arbitration of Wages,
Working Agreements, and Rules sub-
mitted to Judge Kenesaw M. Landis
as Arbitrator by agreement between
the Building Contractors and the
Trades Council, has a tendency of
creating a precedent in settling wage
disputes. There are strong reasons
for believing that the United States
will see a great development in this
field in coming years. Few business
men, before the war, knew anything
about the matters of arbitration and
lawyers were skeptical of its merits.
The term "arbitration" suggested
red tape, haggling and compromising
and hence something very different
from justice, which knows nothing
of concessions and swaps. The pub-
lic for the first time, does now begin
to realize that back of these arbitra-
tion proceedings there lay tremen-
dous potentialities.
The common law was little con-
cerned with the disputes of traders.
The organization of Courts Pepou-
dros or better known as "dusty foot"
courts took place during the time of
the Saxons and lasted until the nine-
teenth century in English market
towns. These were the merchants
courts. The proceedings were had
without delay and without etiquette
since the suitors proceeded from
their stalls into the hearing cham-
ber, dusty booted and eager to settle
a dispute before their petition lost
their crackle. It was a long time be-
fore the technique of arbitration was
worked out to entire success.
The American Civil War, accord-
ing to a report of the Municipal
Court of Chicago, played a consider-
able role in developing the practice
of arbitration in Great Britain.
Numerous disputes arose between
foreign traders. These were worked
out under rules of arbitration so suc-
cessfully that the practice was taken
up by other bodies. This form of
arbitration, however, has to do with
trade associations both domestic and
foreign and which are now encourag-
ing the incorporation of clauses in
contracts to submit to arbitration
those disputes which might arise in
due course of dealing.
Difference between trade disputes
'and wage disputes.
The history of arbitration which
has been set out only minutely here-
tofore deals with those forms of
trade arbitrations settling disputes
of a commercial nature only. The sub-
mission to an arbitrator of those dis-
putes arising out of wage and work-
:ing agreements is without precedent
in Chicago with the exception of the
case of Packers and Workers settled
before Judge Alschuler some few
years ago. The settlement of the
disputes presented to Judge Landis
in May, 1921, affords an opportunity
for arbitration laws of a national
character in which the public shall
be made a co-arbitrator. That the
settlement of disputes between em-
ployers and wage earners decided by
a man of such high legal attainments
as Judge Landis possesses, clearly
leads one to believe that the various
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clauses interpreted, carried a mean-
ing attached to them of a legal na-
ture.
The settlement of wage disputes
seems to have become a question of
Victory between opposing forces,
with the abolition of unions on the
one hand and maintaining the union
standard on the other as an incident
in the settlement. The public, as in-
nocent bystander, is in the usual pre-
carious position with a fair chance
of heading the casualty list. And
yet the public interest is of the great-
est importance. Certainly there is
a crying need of a general under-
standing that co-operation, not con-
flict, is the only solution to such prob-
lems, in which the public is vitally
interested. I feel that the treatment
the public has had in the past war-
rants the most magnanimous con-
sideration on the part of our legis-
lative committees in Congress. To
maintain the high standard of living
to which the American people have
been raised, requires the whole-
NEWS ABOUT
A CALL TO THE WILD.
The primary purpose of establish-
ing this department was to publish
the various successes and activities
of old "Grads" at the Bar. The edi-
tors are more than desirous of re-
ceiving any and all information con-
cerning the progress of past N. D.
Law Graduates, and they earnestly
solicit contributions for this section
from all those who fortunately pos-
sess interesting news of a Notre
Dame legal light.
Why should the glad tidings of an
alumnus' legal achievement be esote-
ric? So therefore, all ye loyal law-
yers let your contributions be forth-
coming.
hearted co-operation of government
and people, as well as a frank recog-
nition on the part of employer and
worker of each others rights and du-
ties.
That part of the public that has
been affected, I say, is neither dis-
couraged nor disheartened. The
business situation that is developing
is gradually arising above that which
was a product of the distorting in-
fluences born of war. The result of
the arbitration has been noted
throughout the country especially in
those districts wherein wage disputes
were becoming a national question.
The application of the award to those
differences arising between employer
and worker has proved to be of great
benefit and has assisted materially in
the building situation and only now
are we reaching the lower slopes
from which we can look down on the
valleys of stability and arriving at a
liew era of sound and enduring pros-
perity, of social order and happiness.
THE ALUMNI
HON. M. 0. BURNS, LL.B., '88.
Honorable Michael 0. Burns, of
Hamilton, Ohio, recently delivered a
marvelous speech at Newark on the
subject of "Old Age Pension Legisla-
tion." With a thundering appeal this
eminent Notre Dame Alumnus pre-
sented the question of Old Age Pen-
sion Laws and was frequently inter-
rupted with great applause. He
vividly portrayed the necessity of
their adoption in this country and
showed how wonderfully well the
aged people of England, France and
Germany get along where old age
pensions have been established by ap-
propriate legislation. He said that if
'old age pension laws are enacted in
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
this country, then those old men and
women who daily go along the path
of life grinding out their lives, will
need have no fear of the "Poor
House" if they find themselves in
later years unable to work any longer
or provide the necessities of life.
At the .close of his oration, Hon.
Burns received an ovation that was
in itself the sincerest compliment.
He is of the old Law School back in
the glorious days of Colonel Hoyne
and old Sorin Hall, and undoubtedly
it will be interesting to many to know
that President Father Burns and
Hon. Burns were classmates while
attending Notre Dame years ago.
The powerful and convincing ora-
tory of Hon. Burns is very renowned
throughout Southern Ohio, and this
together with his brilliant record at
the Bar has continually reflected im-
mense credit on his old Alma Mater
-Notre Dame.
MR. LEO. HASSENAUER,
LL.B., '20.
Surely you all remember the ener-
getic Leo, especially for his beloved
and glorious ideas concerning a real
Law Club Banquet. He told you fre-
quently that Law had 'been always
his one and only hobby, and that he
fully intended to follow it. True to
his word, Leo, after receiving his
LL.B., in June, 1920, started to prac-
tice in Chicago, and the most recent
news of his progress which reached
the office of the Editor-in-chief stated
that he was admitted to Federal
Practice in Judge Landis' Court last
month.
* * *:
MR. GERALD J. CRAUGH,
LL.B., '21.
"Jerry" is now gracing the offices
of Grout & Grout in New York City
on Broadway. He tells us that he
likes it very well and we are not sure
whether he means "Broadway" or the
"Law." He is serving out his year
of clerkship which is necessary in
New York before an applicant is per-
mitted to take the State Bar Exami-
nation. We have no doubt that Ger-
ald will easily pass his Bar Examina-
tion at the expiration of his year, and
perhaps he will specialize in Cor-
porate Law, the Law which he al-
ways mastered.
MR. WILLIAM S. ALLEN,
LL.B., '21.
In a letter from Mr. Allen we find
that he is connected with Pam &
Hurd in the Rookery, Chicago. He
refers to a statement made by Col-
onel Hoyne at the Law Club Banquet
held in Mishawaka '20, and says that
no truer words were ever spoken,
namely "That the Law is a jealous
mistress." Without a doubt Mr. Al-
len is right, for if one expects to
make a success out of the law he
simply must sooner or later marry
himself to it.
MR. FRANK J. MILESKI,
L.L.B., '20
Mr. Mileski tells us that he is prac-
ticing in the city of Milwaukee, and
that he had little trouble in passing
his state Bar Exam. with the sterling
inculcations received during his stay
at this Law School. Quoting from his
letter: "I have often heard the re-
mark that the field of Law was over-
crowded but through personal ex-
perience I find it very much to the
contrary." Certainly this last ob-
servation of Mr. Mileski will be quite
encouraging to every young and
hopeful barrister hailing from any
part of Wisconsin, especially Mil-
waukee.
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MR. GEORGE D. O'BRIEN
LL.B., '21
George was for some reason delay-
ed in taking his state Bar Exam.
with the rest of his class, but this
six month delay did not in the slight-
est discourage "Obie," and we have
word before us that he very success-
fully passed the Illinois Bar last Dec-
ember. While attending Notre Dame
he was famous for his clever carica-
tures and Juggler Jokes, and at pres-
ent he is having this debate with him-
self: Shall I be a Lawyer or an Art-
ist? Frankly, we believe "Obie"
should be both, for then he can al-
ways draw clients.
MR. ANDREW L. McDONOUGH,
LL.B., '19
We have before us the following
card from one of Notre Dame's finest
track heroes-Andrew L. McDon-
ough and Andrew V. McDonough
announce their association in the
general practice of Law under the
firm name of "McDonough & Mc-
Donough," with offices in the Bab-
cock Building, Plainfield, New Jer-
sey, and in the Elizabeth Trust Build-
ing, Elizabeth, New Jersey. This
splendid combination of legal geni-
uses will undoubtedly be greeted with
an array of legal victories in the
towns of Plainfield and Elizabeth,
for surely there is the law, and each
victory will be a victory for Notre
Dame and her College of Law.
MR. FRANCIS J. CLOHESSY,
LL.B., '19
Leaving Notre Dame after his
graduation Francis J. immediately
located himself in Waverly, N. York
and began the practice of the Great-
est of Games, LAW. His start at the
very outset was spelt with success.
Just last November when the Tioga
County Court opened its new term
there were four Criminal Cases
docketed for trial the first week, and
it was found that three of the four
defendants had Francis Clohessy for
their counsel.
John Fitzgerald, a well known
railroad man was tried first. He was
held for having taken part in an au-
tomobile accident and driving away
from the scene without first
leaving his name and address
with an officer or the injured party,
as required by law. After sub-
mitting evidence for two days
the State rested its case. Then our
yuong protege, Francis, in a short
argument before the Court contend-
ed that the State had conclusively
shown that an automobile alleged to
have been owned by Mr. Fitzgerald
had figured in the accident. But he
further said that no evidence had
been submitted by the State to show
that the defendant was driving the
automobile or was occupying it at
the time of the accident. And on this
he predicated his motion for a dis-
missal of the case; that no evidence
had been introduced to show that
John Fitzgerald had committed a
crime. After a 10 minute recess
Judge Andrews granted the defend-
ant's motion and dismissed the case.
The dismissal of a Crimnial Action
in a County Court is very unusual in
the present day trials, and Mr. Fitz-
gerald's quick discharge bespeaks a
brilliant victory for his attorney
Francis J. Clohessy, one of Notre
Dame's very finest legal products.
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THE CLASS OF '21 AT THE BAR - THEIR LETTERS
The letter of Charles P. J. Mooney,
published in the June issue of the
Law Reporter, had informed us of
his splendid success. The following
is from the letter of Charles P. J.
Mooney, senior, father of the Charles
of the Class of '21:
Memphis, Tenn, Aug. 9, 1921
My dear Judge Vurpillat:
Out of a group of 114 candidates
Charles' general average in the bar
examination was the highest. This
word from the Secretary. The Sec-
retary told Captain Fauntleroy, my
assistant, that while in some sub-
jects a few graded a little higher than
Charles, he went uniformly high in
all subjects and seemed to have a
thorough understanding of the sub-
jects. The candidates were from the
leading universities outside and in-
side the State.
I am writing this as a note of ap-
preciation to you and the other mem-
bers of the Law Faculty.
Charles is on the paper. He must
wait till the County Court meets to
get a formal character certificate.
My thanks to you, and best wishes.
Yours truly,
C. P. J. MooNEY
We are justly proud of the record
Charles has made and of the expres-
sion of appreciation coming from his
father, who is a man of high stand-
ing in public life in the South, and is
an editor of The Commercial Appeal
of Memphis, Tennessee. We have
been recently informed that Charles
P. J. Mooney, '21, has taken a place
in a firm of noted corporation law-
yers of Memphis.
Immediately following the an-
nouncement of the results of the Oc-
tober Bar Examination held in
Springfield, Illniois, a telegram was
directed to the Dean of the School
of Law, which reads in substance as
follows: (telegram not at hand.)
Illinois members of the Class of
'21 made five touchdowns at the bar
examination just held at Springfield.
Henry W. Fritz, Edmund J. Maeg-
her, William S. Allen, Alden J. Cus-
ick and George Witteried. Con-
gratulations due on account of our
good course in law at Notre Dame.
(Signed) HENRY W. FRITZ
A letter since received from Law-
yer Fritz informs us that he is al-
ready actively engaged in the prac-
tice and he relates his first case ex-
perience (and promises to do better
next time).
We have letters from all these Il-
linois Boys except George Witteried,
who has visited us since his success-
ful passing of the bar, and told us of
his intentions to "get going soon."
We have a very beautiful personal
letter from William S. Allen, writ-
ten from 858, The Rookery, Chicago.
At the outset he issues a peremptory
writ of mandamus against its pub-
lication. But we must remind him
that for every reasonable exercise of
the polive power the good citizen
must sustain his loss cheerfully and
without legal compensation. In the
interest of the. public welfare there-
fore we shall proceed to publish in
the Law Reporter what is deemed
printable. He says:
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
"I want this to be a personal let-
ter to you, so please do not put it in
the Law Reporter. I want to tell you
that I am grateful beyond words to
you for your instruction and for your
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
many courtesies and favors to me.
"Five members of the Class of
1921 passed he Illinois Bar examin-
ation held in Springfield in October.
The exam. was a typical Illinois Bar
examination. I think you can deduce
about what it was like. We shall
take the attorney's oath before the
Supreme Court of Illinois at Spring-
field next Thursday. We are the
first class to go in under the new
amendment to the rules of the Su-
preme Court which requires the ap-
plication to appear in person before
the court to take the oath and receive
his license.
I am working or the firm of Pam
& Hurd in the Rookery. I always have
been an enthusiast for the law and
still like it. The firm is a good one
and they do more office work
than court work. I firmly believe
what Col. Hyones told us at the Law
Banquet in 1920-that "The Law is a
jealous mistress". No truer words
were ever spoken.
I happened to be in Judge Landis'
courtroom the other morning and saw
Leo Hassenauer (Class of '20) ad-
mitted to Federal practice.
I want to thank you again for put-
ting me through the Illinois Bar ex-
am., and also hope you will remember
me to the Law Faculty and my other
friends at school.
Very Sincerely Yours,
WILLIAM S. ALLEN
We fully appreciate the fine senti-
ment of Mr. Allen's letter, so charac-
teristic of him. All at Notre Dame
well know his excellent record for
scholarship and deportment and
unanimously assure him of immediate
and continued success in the service
of the beautiful though "jealous
mistress."
The following enthusiastic letter
from Chicago speaks for itself con-
cerning one of N. D.'s most favor-
ably known scholars:
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
On Tuesday and Wednesday of
last week I took the Illinois Bar Ex-
amination at Springfield. And yes-
terday I learned that I was succesful.
Almost needless to say, my good
fortune confirms in my mind what I
have several times said to you and
often said to others, namely, that
Notre Dame law is as good as Har-
vard law or Columbia law or George-
town law-as good as the law of any
university in the land. Had I failed
in my first tussle with the Board of
Examiners, neither the Law School
nor yourself and able staff would
have shared the blame. My high
opinion of Notre Dame would have
remained unchanged. But having
succeeded, I feel appreciative to you
and your associates to a degree
which is beyond expression. Please
convey this thought to all members
of the law faculty whose united ef-
forts have made my good fortune
possible. With me, your stock and
theirs will sell par every day in the
year.
Of course I will be down for the
Nebraska game. At that time I will
see you and Professors Tiernan,
Farabaugh, Frederickson and Cos-
tello to personally convey my grati-
tude. Until then, believe me to be
Very truly yours,
ALDEN J. CUSICK
Mr. Cusick expects to apply his
splendid legal talents along special
lines of endeavor. He launched his
work as a representative of the
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company of Milwaukee. He has tak-
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en a position recently with the great
advertising concern, Thos. J. Cusack
Company. Mr. Cusickl's splendid
ability will assure his success any-
where.
From 4830 Indiana Ave., Chicago,
comes the following letter:
Dear Judge:
Just a line to let ou know that I
was successful in the October Bar
X. I am pleased to take this oppor-
tunity of extending my gratitude to
yourself and the other members of
of the Law Faculty for the excellent
course that I received at N. D.
The exam was comprised almost
exclusively of Constitutional law,
Evidence, Property, Wills, Conflict
of Laws, Equity and Common Law
Pleading. I feel that my success in
the exam. was due primarily to a
good course in Pleading and Conflict
of Laws, as about twenty-five of the
questions were on these two subjects.
With best wishes for a successful
year, I remain
Very truly yours,
EDMUND J. MEAGHER
The letter was too slow for the
good news in the following case, so
came this telegram: "Rochelle, Ill.,
Dec. 15, 1921. (To the Dean) Thanks
to you and all the rest. I passed the
State Bar Examination. Your system
is great. GEORGE D. O'BRIEN."
George did not complete the re-
quired time of resident study until
the close of Summer School and
therefore did not take the Illinois
Bar Examination with the June
members of his class. George makes
the sixth of the Class of '21 to pass
the Illinois Bar. In a letter previous
to the examination he expressed the
hope that he might honor the Law
School by passing, and also gave high
praise and credit to the school and its
course.
Three of the Indiana members of
the Class of '21 have passed the re-
quired examination and been admit-
ted to the St. Joseph County Bar As-
sociation, and are engaged in the
practice of law in South Bend. Frank
Coughlin was recently appointed
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Wal-
ter A. Rice and Harry Richwine,
while practicing law in South Bend,
are also pursuing their studies in
the Law School for the master's de-
gree.
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DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA
Tuscon-
James V. Robins,
107 Melrose St.
ARKANSAS
Little Rock-
Aristo Brizzolara,
217 E. Sixth St.
CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles-
Terence Cocgrove,
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
John G. Mott, of
Mott & Cross,
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
Michael J. McGarry,
530 Higgins Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
San Francisco-
Alphonsus Heer,
1601 Sacramento St.
COLORADO
Telluride.-
James Hanlon
CONNECTICUT
Bridgeport-
Donato Lepore,
645 E. Washington Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
784 Noble Ave.
Hartford-
James Curry and Thos. Curry, of
Curry & Curry,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Washington-
Timothy Ansberry,
208-12 Southern Bldg.
GEORGIA
Atlanta-
Fay Wood,
225 E. Fourth St.
ILLINOIS
Aurora-
Robert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
Batavia-
Joseph Feldott
Belvidere-
Stephen F. McGonigle,
1011 Whitney St.
Budd-
Arthur B. Hughes
Campus-
Francis T. Walsh
Chicago-
Francis O'Shaughenessy,
10 S. LaSalle St.
Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
John Jos. Cook,
3171 Hudson Ave.
James V. Cunningham,
1610 Conway Bldg.
Hugh J. Daly,
614 Woodland Park
Leo J. Hassenauer,
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
William C. Henry,
7451 Buell Ave.
John S. Hummer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
Daniel L. Madden,
Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
William J. McGrath,
648 N. Carpenter St.
Thos. J. McManus,
5719 Michigan Ave.
John F. O'Connell,
155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
1060 The Rookery
Clifford O'Sullivan,
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
Francis X. Rydzewskl,
8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
Decatur-
William P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
Dixon-
John Sherwood Dixon,
East Ottowa-
Harry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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East St. Louis-
Joseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
Elgin-
Thos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy,
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence McNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
Galesburg-
Hon. Charles Craig
Hoopeston-
George E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
Howard-
Paul J. Donovan
Kewanee-
Thomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
Leda-
Daniel P. Keegan
Mendota-
John W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
Maline-
Peter Meersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. Carmel-
Martin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
(Ottowa--
Robert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 iMoloney Bldg.
Peoria-
George Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
Polo-
Robert Bracken
Robinson-
William E. Bradbury,
Rochelle-
Thomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.
Rock Island-
Francis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
Springfield-
Thomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
Streator-
Elmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
Woodstock-
Paul Donovan,
Hoy Block
INDIANA
Anderson-
Edward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
Crawfordsville--
Justin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
Elkhart-
James S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
East Chicago-
Hugh E. Carroll
Fort Wayne-
William P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
Frankfort-
Earl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
Gary-
Henry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
Indianapolis-
James E. Deeky,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
Kokomo-
George F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
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Lafayette-
Francis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrange-
George D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
Linton-
Hugh E. Carroll
Marion-
Fred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan City-
Lorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
Mishawaka-
Ralph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. Main St.
Montgomery-
Bernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsville-
Harry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South Bend-
Leo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William Mclnerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.
John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
Vincennes--
Louis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
Carroll-
Joseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des Moines-
William J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
Dubuque-
Patrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort Dodge-
Michael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell Bldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida Grove-
Matthew M. White
Iowa City-
John J. Ney
Lenox-
Eugene F. McEniry
Mason City-
John D. Wilson
Muscatine-
Richard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
Newton-
Ralph Bergman
Preston-
Harry Godes
Waverly-
Humphrey L. Leslie,
204 S. State St.
KANSAS
Kansas City-
Russell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.
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KENTUCKY
Lebanon-
Samuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
Owensboro-
Albert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
LOUISIANA
New Orleans-
Patrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
MASSACHUSETTS
Boston-
William P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
Springfield-
William J. Granfield
Court Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
Detroit-
Harry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wurzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
Flint-
Vincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand Rapids-
Joseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
Jackson-
James G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
Lansing-
Maurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
Crookston-
Edmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Duluth-
Thomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
Minneapolis-
Edward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. Cloud-
George L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.
31ISSOURI
Kansas City-
Leonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.
St. Louis-
John L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
Butte--
Timothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
Galen-
Albert Galen,
Galen Block
Malta-
William McGarry
NEBRASKA
Wahoo-
Frank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
Elko--
Edmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
Reno-
Michael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
Plainfield-
Andrew L. McDonough,
Babcock Bldg.
Rockaway-
Daniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las Vegas-
Thomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
Albany-
T. Paul McGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
Buffalo--
Max G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
Geneva-
Francis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
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.Ahester-
Daniel J. Quinlan,
47 Exchange St.
New York City-
Simeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
Palmyra-
Harold P. Burke
Waverly-
Francis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
NORTH DAKOTA
Minot-
George McGee
Park River-
Jacob V. Birder
Rugby-
Thomas Toner,
Main St.
OHIO
Akron-
Clarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Mlain St.
Cincinnati-
Ernest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland-
1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
Columbus-
Donald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
Dayton-
Thomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
Hamilton-
Michael O'Burns,
338 S. Second St.
Lancaster-
Michael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.
Lima-
Francis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
Maumee-
Peter M. Ragan
Napoleon-
Edwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
Sandusky-
Edmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
Toledo-
Robert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.
Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwood Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOMA
Tulsa-
Harold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
Astoria-
James L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
Independence-
Francis W. Kirkdand
Portland-
Roscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
Woodburn-
Stephen Scollard
PENNSYLVANIA
Homestead-
John J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
Jeanette-
John W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
Johnstown-
John C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
Philadelphia-
James P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.
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Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
Pittsburgh-
Daniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
Rydal-
Edward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
Chamberlain-
Nicholas Furlong
Edgemont-
William A. Guilfoyle
Howard-
Theodore Feyder
TENNESSEE
Memphis-.
Charles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
Beaumont-
Harry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
Sinton-
Bryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
Centralia-
William Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
Fennimore-
Ralph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg.
Green Bay-
John Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
Milwaukee-
Frank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.
Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.
Neelsville-
George A. Frantz
Plymouth-
Gilbert P. Hand,
105 Milwaukee St.
Racine-
Grover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
Sparta-
John P. Doyle,
508 S. Water St.
Superior-
Sherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
Ceinfuegos-
Andrew Castille,
Box 505
MEXICO
Mexico City-
Alfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLAND8
Beinaton Union-
Bernardo Lopez
Manila-
Jose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, Tarlac-
Jose Urquico
Misamia Province-
Emilio Aranus
Sorsogen-
Doroteo Amador
